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Abstract
This paper analyses the complementarities between land productiv-
ity and conservation investments in the context of river embankment 
maintenance in the Indian Sundarbans. The study finds that households 
whose principal occupation is aquaculture commit more resources to 
embankment maintenance relative to those in non-aquaculture employ-
ment. While conservation efforts are greater in all types of aquaculture 
plots irrespective of distance from the embankments, such efforts un-
ambiguously decrease for agricultural plots that are located at a dis-
tance from the embankments. Private returns to aquaculture are much 
higher than returns to agriculture, enabling aquaculture households in 
invest in managing their local public good. However, there is evidence 
of free riding in canal-based aquaculture when users draw water from 
a single source. Head-enders with greater wealth as well as intense 
social networks tend to free-ride while tail-enders with less land hold-
ings contribute more towards canal maintenance. Furthermore, public 
intervention in embankment maintenance may be crowding out private 
efforts. Thus, in primarily agricultural areas, productivity-enhancing 
policies may be more efficient than policies that fully subsidize public 
good maintenance. 
Keywords: Public good; Embankment maintenance; Voluntary contribu-
tion; Uncertainty; Sundarbans, India.
1Examining Private Participation in Embankment Maintenance in the Indian Sundarbans
Examining Private Participation in Embankment 
Maintenance in the Indian Sundarbans
1. Introduction 
In most developing countries, inadequate provision of local public goods and poor conservation of common 
property resources have often led to private contribution towards the maintenance of these resources. This 
includes, for instance, the contribution of time and effort towards building check dams in watersheds (White and 
Runge, 1995; Gaspart et al., 1998) and participation in soil conservation measures (Gebremedhin and Swinton, 
2003; Fenske, 2011). However, a large part of the literature on conservation of common property resources as well 
as local public goods aligns itself with the view that conservation efforts are more likely to be initiated if property 
rights are well defined. Thus, Lee (1980) and Feder et al. (1988) have argued, for instance, that security of land 
tenancy would encourage committing resources for soil conservation. But Pagiola (1993) inserted the caveat that 
when property rights are secure, there might be perverse incentives for conservation if the resource in question is 
relatively less productive. Although, according to Posner (1977), public intervention, in terms of making property 
rights transferable, can initiate conservation, public provisioning can also crowd out private contribution. As Browne 
and Hoyt (2000) and Kunreuther and Pauly (2004) have shown, government disaster protection programs can 
reduce private self-protection investments. Thus, private conservation expenditure can be conditioned by either of 
these factors, making the net effect ambiguous. The present study analyzes the linkage between property rights, 
productivity and private contribution expenditure in the context of a specific public good: the river embankments in 
the Indian Sundarbans.
1.1 The Indian Sundarbans
The Indian Sundarbans comprises an archipelago of 102 islands of which 54 are inhabited. It is interspersed with a 
complex network of tidal rivers leading to the Bay of Bengal located on its southern flank. The river embankments 
in the Indian Sundarbans came to be erected in the late 18th century when land reclamation began in the 
Sundarbans during the British colonial period for the purpose of protecting the agricultural land from diurnal tidal 
surges (Richard and Flint, 1990; Bandopadhyay, 2000). Since 1770, when land reclamation began in the Indian 
Sundarbans, the 3,500 km long embankments have served as a flood defence structure though repeatedly ravaged 
by extreme weather events. For instance, researchers have shown how sea-level rise has triggered the erosion, and 
subsequent collapse, of more than 100 square km of the embankments in erosion-prone areas in the last three 
decades (Ghosh et. al., 2003). Since the region is interspersed with tidal rivers, a more frequent disaster comes in 
the form of inundation of settlements from tidal surge which either topples the protecting dykes or breaches them. 
In fact, the mean tidal amplitude of the Sundarbans area (from 5.22 mm to 3.14 mm/yr) is much higher than the 
national average (between 1.06 and 1.75 mm/yr) (Unnikrishnan and Sankar, 2007). With regard to catastrophic 
events, this region has faced 31 severe cyclones between 1961 and 2000, with the majority of them having a 
velocity greater than 100 km/hr and at least 5 exceeding the velocity of 200 km/hr. Cyclone Aila in May, 2009, is 
one such example where almost 500 km of the embankment were washed away affecting over 6.77 million people 
and killing 137 people in the North 24 Parganas and South 24 Parganas parts of the Sundarbans in addition to 
either partially or completely destroying 926,000 semi-permanent houses (Development Research Communication 
and Service Centre, 2009). 
While the responsibility for the maintenance and repair of the embankments still vests officially with the Department 
of Irrigation and Waterways (DIW), Government of West Bengal, it is beginning to transfer gradually the responsibility 
for maintenance to local level institutions such as the panchayats under the aegis of the central wage employment 
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program called the Mahatma Gandhi National Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) with many panchayats 
starting to take on the task of embankment maintenance. 
Private efforts towards the maintenance of river embankments have remained almost negligible since the 
colonial period despite the fact that the collapse of embankments leads to saline water incursion into paddy 
fields and renders them unsuitable for cultivation until next few monsoons. Considering that over 80 percent 
of the Sundarbans inhabitants are engaged in agriculture, the absence of private efforts towards embankment 
maintenance becomes all the more surprising. It is rational to expect that each individual or household’s incentive 
to conserve a river embankment is dependent on the extent of flood protection benefits received. In the case of the 
Indian Sundarbans inhabitants, although agriculture has been the dominant land use type since the colonial period 
of land reclamation—something that was aided by the securitisation of tenancy rights after independence through 
land reforms--agrarian productivity in the islands has remained low due to unfavorable environmental conditions 
and lack of irrigation facilities.1 The productivity of paddy ranges between 1.5 to 2 tonnes per ha in the Indian 
Sundarbans (Center for Science and Environment (CSE), 2012) against a national average of 3.28 tonne per ha. 
1.2 Land Use changes in the Sundarbans 
In the last four decades, there has been an increasing conversion of paddy fields into aquaculture ponds 
(Chaturvedi, 2008) through transfer of land rights as the latter provides a higher return than agriculture (Chopra 
et al., 2009; Knowler et al, 2009). Since the potential for loss (or gains from avoided loss) due to flooding has 
increased, we expect this to increase the incentives for private conservation of embankments. To the best of our 
knowledge, this hypothetical relation between land productivity and inclination for embankment conservation in the 
Indian Sundarbans has not been investigated to date. The objective of this paper is to address this research gap and 
to compare private contribution behaviour under alternative land use choices.
The land conversion phenomenon has been occurring mostly in the northern part of the Sundarbans that is 
interspersed with tidal rivers (Chopra et al., 2009; Ray, 1993). Damage in these areas generally comes from 
breaching and overtopping of embankments by tidal surge. This damage could be reduced through increased 
private maintenance efforts. However, with large systemic shocks such as Cyclone Aila of 2009, restoration and 
stabilization of embankments do require state support. But with increasing pressure on public finances, the state’s 
role in regular repair and maintenance work is expected to gradually phase down (see Figure 1). 
The study addresses two specific questions in this context:
a)  Does private contribution towards river embankments respond to differences in land productivity? 
b)  Does public intervention in embankment protection ‘crowd out’ private investment in maintenance activities? 
For example, do state-supported programs such as the MGNREGA  potentially displace productivity-induced 
conservation efforts?
The remaining part of the paper has the following sequence. In the next section, we will describe the historical 
context of land use, property rights and embankment maintenance in Indian Sundarbans. In section 2 we discuss 
the factors that influence private contribution towards collective good. In section 3, the discussion will focus on 
the theoretical model for private maintenance activities followed by the econometric specification for the model 
estimation in section 4. Section 5 outlines and records the data collection and the estimation strategy. Section 6 
discusses estimation results and section 7 offers concluding observations.
1.3 Embankment Maintenance in the Sundarbans 
Agriculture in the Sundarbans appears counter-intuitive as a land use choice given the mud flats that are the 
natural outcome of the tidal regime. However, since agriculture had a tangible output and was easy to monitor, 
it found favor with the colonial regime as the produce could be easily taxed unlike fisheries (Deshmukh and 
Choudhury, 2002). To secure the returns from the agricultural fields against the threats of tidal inundation, the 
1 Only 12 percent of the cultivable land is irrigated in the Sundarbans: see http://www.sadepartmentwb.org/Socio_Econimic_1.htm
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erection of mud embankments began in 1770 in tandem with land reclamation. Though the British colonial regime 
spelt out tenure agreements for the reclaimed land, they gave no explicit directives regarding the maintenance 
of river embankments. Even as the granting of tenure for reclaimed lands continued, private landlords over 
time encroached forestland in order to extend their landholdings beyond the leased plots by putting up ‘private 
embankments’. 
More than two decades later, the Permanent Settlement Act was enacted in 1793 to regulate property rights over 
the land, which also included, for the first time, clauses about the onus of embankment maintenance (Regulation 
XXXIII). The regulations recognized that while the government would undertake essential public works, it was also 
necessary for landholders to commit resources for the maintenance of embankments (called poolbundy) that 
were adjacent to their plots (Harrison, 1875). However, this attempt to involve private landlords in embankment 
maintenance did not succeed because the Zamindars [i.e., feudal landlords in British India] in the Sundarbans in 
particular refused to be a party to the covenant and therefore did not sign the undertakings (called kooboolyuts)2. 
The maintenance of the embankments was therefore handed over to the Embankment Committee in 1803 for 
the supervision of the repair and reconstruction of the embankments (Harrison, 1875). However, despite the 
decentralization of embankment management, private participation in maintenance work remained inadequate so 
that subsequently the maintenance of embankments was recognized as public works in the Bengal Embankment 
Act of 1873 (Harrison, 1875; Roy, 2010). 
The reluctance of private landholders to maintain embankments may have arisen due to adverse climatic conditions 
and the concomitant uncertainty regarding returns from agriculture. In fact, land reclamation in the Indian part 
of the Sundarbans was slow and tedious due to the extremely hazardous nature of the site.3 Public expenditure 
data on embankment maintenance for the districts of Bengal during the period 1857-67 reveals that, on average, 
embankments in the Sundarbans required higher repair expenditures per mile relative to other districts (Table 1)4. 
At the same time, there are reasons to suspect that the yield from agricultural lands was not enough to justify the 
maintenance expenditure on embankments. For instance, during the period 1914-1944, the major suppliers of rice 
for the Calcutta city population were the agricultural fields of the Indian Sundarbans. However, since 1944, rice 
for Calcutta had to be imported from districts like Midnapore, Bankura, Burdwan, Birbhum and Murshidabadh, the 
reason being the possible fall in productivity due to increasing soil salinity that failed to keep up with the growing 
demand for rice (Mitra, 1954, p. lv)5. Even in more recent times, the analysis of available block level data for the 
Sundarbans, for the period 1993-2008, shows that the mean yield of aman paddy (i.e., lowland rice grown in the 
wet season during June to November) for the Sundarbans has been consistently lower than the state average (see 
Figure 2)6.
In the backdrop of relatively lower agricultural productivity, it is only natural that households would allocate land 
to alternative uses that promise a relatively higher return than agriculture7. The conversion of agricultural plots 
2 Prior to the Permanent Settlement Act, the government provided a cash subsidy to the Zamindars for embankment maintenance and 
repair. Thus during the 1781-87 period, the Zamindars received a subsidy of INR 16,786 per annum from the colonial administration 
although the efficacy of their maintenance work remained questionable. In fact, according to Harrison (1875), the salt manufacturers 
later procured this subsidy with the complaint that the Zamindars were neglecting the embankments.
3 Richard and Flint (1990) note that in 1905 only 40 percent of the land in the 24 Parganas of the Sundarbans had been reclaimed 
while settlement was almost complete in the Bakharganj and Khulna portions of the Sundarbans (which are now part of Bangladesh). 
At the time, the Sundarbans were defined as the area bounded on the northern side by the limits of the permanent settlement in the 
24 Parganas, Jessore (later Khulna), and Bakarganj districts and in the south by the sea face stretching from the Hughli estuary to the 
Meghna river mouth.
4 The owners of the plots called the lotdars were asked to maintain at least 3/4th of the land fit for cultivation in their lease contract. In 
a way this implied that they ought to keep the embankments stable too and, thus, must engage in timely repairs. The Zamindars in fact 
appointed special guards to monitor the state of the embankments called beldars who would also initiate repairs of imminent breaches. 
However, their efficacy in embankment maintenance would not have been satisfactory considering the frequent complaints of neglect 
(Mitra, 1954, p.lvii). 
5 The Planning Commission in its report in 1981 further asserted that monsoon dependence as well as increasing soil salinity coupled 
with weak irrigation facilities impairs the possibility of providing year-round livelihoods from agricultural activities in the Sundarbans 
(Report on the Development of Coastal Areas affected with Salinity, Indian Planning Commission, 1981).
6 The t-test on the equality of means is rejected at less than one percent level of significance against the alternative hypothesis that the 
average yield rate for the state is higher than in the Sundarbans area. Further, the relative dispersion (coefficient of variation) of the yield 
rates for this period is also higher for the Sundarbans area (.18 ) compared to the West Bengal state average ( .10 ).These are figures for 
coefficient of variation.
7 Alternatively, with inelastic substitution possibilities across different land use, one option is to engage in non-farm employment. It is a 
fact that marginal workers in South 24 parganas part of the Sundarbans have increased by eight fold during the 1992 to 2001 period 
(Center for Science and Environment (CSE),2012) . 
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into brackish water aquaculture farms in some parts of the Sundarbans provides a prominent example of such 
reallocation of land use where tidal water carrying fish carp, which is unsuitable for irrigation due to its salinity,8 
is impounded for fish farming (Kumar,2012). In order to convert lands for this purpose, inlets are dug in the mud 
embankments and tidal water allowed to flow into the fields through an extensive network of private canals as well 
as derelict water-discharge canals. This conversion of paddy fields into brackish water aquaculture in the Indian 
Sundarbans was recorded as early as the 1930’s although the process accelerated only after the seventies (Ray, 
1993)9. In absolute terms, out of a total brackish water culture area in the Indian Sundarbans of 42,000 ha, more 
than 80 percent of the aquaculture farms are located in the North 24 Parganas part of the Sundarbans. About 7000 
ha are located in Canning, Gosaba and Basanti blocks of the Sundarbans area located in the South 24 Parganas.10,11
While the aquaculture farms initially combined both paddy cultivation and fish culture in the same plot, this practice 
has been gradually replaced with perennial bheries (or fish ponds) with year-round operations of aquaculture (Ray, 
1993). These aquaculture farms can be categorized into two groups depending on the source of brackish water 
withdrawal: (i) farms that are connected to multifarious plots through feeder canal networks supplying brackish 
water (hence forth called multiple source) and (ii) households that have their own inlet of brackish water (hence 
forth single source) to feed their ponds. 
2. Voluntary Contribution in Embankment Maintenance 
River embankments are a class of pure non-excludable public goods in terms of the locally universal benefits they 
offer in the form of flood protection. However, they also falls into the category of the “weakest link public goods” in 
that the total quantity available to each consumer is equal to the smallest contribution of the individual (Hirshleifer, 
1983 and 1985). What this means is that the least maintained part of the dyke determines the welfare of the whole 
population. Cornes (1993) has, therefore, argued that, in equilibrium, there is normally under-provision of the public 
good.12 However, if potential contributors are homogenous in terms of taste and endowment then providing a 
threshold amount of weakest link public good may result in an efficient provision (Sandler, 2002).
Individual contribution towards the provision of local public goods such as embankments would crucially depend 
upon the absolute level of wealth and its distribution (i.e., degree of inequality), and the array of available exit 
options. Studies have emphasized that unless wealth reaches a critical value no contribution would be forthcoming 
(Bergstrom et al., 1986). Here, a transfer from the contributor to the non-contributing agent (i.e., those having 
lower asset holdings) may be useful on normative grounds but may actually reduce the overall provision of public 
goods (Baland and Platteau, 1996).13 In the specific context of coastal embankments in Goa, Mukhopadhyay (2005) 
obtains this result where an otherwise egalitarian land transfer has resulted in decreased interest among the 
traditional groups of big landholders towards embankment maintenance, thus providing disincentives for collective 
action. Similar wealth effects are described in Olson (1965) where the richer member in a privileged group would 
bear the conservation expenditures alone if his benefit share from the collective good exceeds the cost of provision. 
However, if the fixed cost of such infrastructure related public goods is high and the benefit shares for all agents 
fall short of the threshold that is required for the public good to yield any benefit, then there would be no voluntary 
8 The increasing salinity of the river water in the Sundarbans is the result of most estuarine rivers becoming disconnected from the 
Ganges (the freshwater source) over time (Naskar and Mandal, 1999; Ray, 1993).
9 For instance,in Sandeshkhali II block in North 24 Parganas of Sundarbans vast tracts of agricultural land were leased out for aquaculture 
in the mid seventies following lower returns in paddy cultivation due to salinity and low ground water levels (Bhattacharyya and Ninan, 
2011).
10 The policy dialogue for promoting sustainable shrimp aquaculture in the Sundarbans can be found in the WWF Report, available at: 
http://assets.wwfindia.org/downloads/annexure_3.pdf
11 Using the National Remote Sensing Agency (NRSA) data for land use change during the 1986-2004 period, Chopra et al. (2009) show 
that the transformation of paddy fields to aquaculture uses has been the highest in the North 24 Parganas part of the Sundarbans 
compared to the South 24 Pargana part of the Sundarbans. Further, when we obtained the correlation between the percentage of the 
area converted to aquaculture and the average yield rate of aman paddy, the principal agricultural crop for the chosen blocks (Chopra et 
al., 2009), it came to -0.36 showing that more than one-third variation in land conversion is negatively associated with changes in return 
from land.
12 In the weaker link version of the problem, the production function of the public good is given by Q = a n
q
j
v
j
y/< Fv
1
 where QQ is the total 
public good and qj  is the contribution of the j
th individual. Utility maximization subject to the budget constraint solves for q as a function 
of income and unit cost of provision. Thus, individual contribution depends on the preference parameter ν, income of the individual and 
the cost of provision and is likely to differ for heterogeneous agents.
13 Ghosh and Karaivanov (2007) have shown that if all agents are homogenous, such reduction in public good provision in the presence of 
an increase in alternative income can actually reduce welfare.
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nvestment. This Nash equilibrium corresponds to the phenomenon of co-ordination failure (Baland and Platteau, 
1996).
Individual commitment towards public good such as embankments can also exist if there is a collective 
arrangement for embankment conservation. In such cases, individual contribution would be guided by commonly 
decided norms with possible exceptions in instances where there would be incentives to defect. In case of Indian 
Sundarbans, especially that in North 24 Parganas, there are traces of such coordinated arrangements where 
aquaculture farm owners with plots in canal based aquaculture collaborate in terms of collective payments for 
maintenance activities14. In addition, the landholders chose a few members from among them to constitute a 
committee that was empowered to adjudicate in disputes over land demarcation in the fishery fields, to estimate 
the annual maintenance and repair cost of the embankments, and to determine the mode of apportionment of the 
cost share. Nevertheless, cases where the choice of conservation was determined at the village level was more 
the exception than the rule; in most cases, the fisheries based on feeder canal networks were devoid of collective 
organizations. In such instances, the contribution towards embankment maintenance was the result of individual 
optimization. This was also the case with households that directly draw water from the river through single outlets 
into their own land.
In order to identify the factors that influence household contribution towards embankment maintenance, we 
therefore formulate in the next section a general model of the household choice of land use and their contribution 
towards embankment maintenance.
3. The Theoretical Model
A rational individual will commit resources for embankment conservation only if the commitment is not larger than 
the expected avoided loss if the embankment is breached. The expected avoided loss is in turn influenced by the 
nature of land use, i.e., the returns from the land that the embankment protects from tidal incursion. Hence, the 
household has to decide upon the most profitable use for the land in their possession and the effort that must be 
exerted towards embankment conservation in order to avoid loss from the tidal inundation of land. Let us consider 
a rural farm household that is endowed with an initial stock of land L that could be kept in agriculture or can be 
converted to aquaculture.15
L = LA + LF          (1)
where, LA : total landholding under agriculture and LF total landholding under aquaculture.
The Agricultural (A) and Aquaculture output (F) exhibit a production function that we characterise as having  
constant returns to scale,
A = A(LA)           (2)
F = F(LF)            (3)
However, the returns from the plots are uncertain since the river embankments that bound them often breach 
under tidal surges, causing saline water to either spoil the agricultural crop or sweep away fish carps resulting 
in the loss of outputs. Although the extent of loss depends on spatial factors such as proximity of the plot to the 
embankments, it would also depend on whether the embankments are well maintained since that would minimize 
the extent of the breach. The nature of the breach in turn depends on individual conservation efforts and public 
maintenance in the past. 
14 Initially villagers leased out their land for aquaculture and the land lessees were outsiders. As a result events of tidal inundation were 
almost immediately followed by non-payment of lease rentals and in extreme case abandonment of aquaculture farms (Bhattacharyya, 
2009). Thereafter village community decided to carry out aquaculture on their own.
15 Conversion of cropland into modern aquaculture ponds involves a degree of irreversibility as the soil becomes loaded with acid 
sulphates and hinders further production of crops. This cost of land conversion is intertemporal in nature and the land allocation 
decision between alternative uses have been modeled from the perspective of a social planner in a dynamic set up elsewhere (see 
Bhat and Bhatta, 2004). However, this study attempts to model the private land allocation decisions of farm owners in a static partial 
equilibrium framework. 
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Suppose, LAE and LFE and denote the total agricultural and aquaculture land that adjoin the embankments 
respectively and kC and G are the current private conservation efforts and past public maintenance efforts 
respectively. The extent of public maintenance in the past is likely to determine the resilience of the embankment 
in the face of a tidal surge. This in turn affects the intensity of the loss suffered by the household with a given 
land holding. While perceptibly the loss increases relative to the proximity of the land to the embankments, it 
decreases relative to the private and public conservation efforts. We also assume that conservation through private 
contribution alone in the absence of public investment would be inefficient and lead to irreparable loss.16
Thus, the loss function for agricultural and aquaculture activities from an embankment breach can be specified as17
SA = SA (LAE , kC , G)          (4) 
SF = SF (LFE , kC , G)         (5) 
2LiE
2Si > 0,
2kc
2Si < 0,
2G
2Si <0, where "i" = A, F
The cost incurred by the households for embankment maintenance can be represented as
CE = C(kC) , C' >0           (6)
Further, note that the land facing embankments for each type of activity can be specified as a constant fraction of 
the total land devoted to each use such that:
LAE = αLA            (7) 
LFE = βLF            (8)
where 0 ≤ α,β ≤ 1
If the probability of embankment breach is p and the level of public assistance is G, then the expected profits (or 
loss) function of farm households is given by equation 9 below. Since it is rational for him to maximize his expected 
profit, we have18,
MaxE (π) = p[A(LA) + rF(LF) – SA (LAE,kc, G) – SF (LFE, kc, G) – C(kc)] + (1–p) [A(LA) + rF(LF) – C(kc)]  (9)
subject to the constraints (1), (7), (8) and kc>= 0. Here r stands for the price of aquaculture output while the prices 
of the agriculture outputs are normalized to unity. Given the non-negativity constraint and assuming that (1), (6) and 
(7) are binding, the farm household chooses LF  and kc to maximize the expected profit. The Kuhn-Tucker necessary 
conditions yield:
πiLF : = LF [p(αS'AL(.) – βS'FL(.)) – A(.) + rF' (.)] = 0       (10)
Thus, LF > 0  only if rF' (.) – pβS'FL = A' (.) – aS'AL, i.e., the expected net benefit from the aquaculture land is at least 
as large as that of agricultural land.
Further, πkc : kc [p(—S'Ak(.) — S'fk(.)) + C'(.)] = 0        (11) 
Thus, positive conservation efforts would be observed if the avoided expected loss is no greater than the marginal 
cost of conservation, i.e., k*c >0 only if p (S'AK(.) + S'FK(.)) = C'(.). Observe that given the land use and the potential 
loss by (4) and (5), optimal conservation efforts might be zero if  P > S'AK (.)+ S'F K (.)
C' (.) . Thus, if the probability of 
embankment damage is greater than the conservation cost per unit loss of output at the margin, the agent may 
choose not to contribute to embankment maintenance.
16 Thus, it amounts to assuming Si = SiE  (LiE, kc, 0) → Ri, i = A, F where Ri the maximum return from ith land use . For instance one could 
conceive (4) and (5) as Si = LiE /G (kc+ 1), i = A, F  that satisfies the above condition.
17 Another way of accounting the loss from inundation would be to incorporate the distance of the plots from the river embankments. 
However, we choose to model the land use decision and the associated maintenance effort of the households given the location of their 
plots and here distance of the plots is regarded as a parameter rather than a choice variable. The distance parameter, incorporated in 
this model, would thus represent the probability of damage p keeping the basic results unchanged. 
18 The model is formulated as a simple Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) type decision process. However, since most decision agents are 
smallholder subsistence farmers with few alternative livelihood options there could be a ‘safety first’ or ‘survival algorithm’ dimension 
related to ensuring some minimum food production to meet family needs, regardless of a simple CBA rule. An alternative way of 
modeling this is to incorporate a form of inequality constraint where food production cannot go below some level with some probability.
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From (9) we can solve for the optimum conservation efforts as 
 k*c = kc (LA, LF, p, G)          (12)
4. Econometric Specification
Pursuant to expressions (9) and (10), it should be observed that estimation of private conservation expenditure on 
embankments in (11) requires data on the expected loss from tidal inundation. This in turn would depend on the 
probability of damage (p) as well as the return from the affected plots. The probability of damage can be expressed 
as a function of a) Plot Location: closer the plot is to the river, higher the risk from breach events; we use the total 
area of plots directly facing the embankments that are owned or leased as a measure of this risk; b) State of the 
Embankment: this is measured by the amount of past maintenance activities by the state agencies as well as the 
past damage events . 
The former can be incorporated once we classify the alternative land uses viz., agriculture and aquaculture 
according to their distance from the embankment. Even within aquaculture, land use type determines the 
susceptibility of the embankment to breach events. For instance, owing to frequent withdrawal and release of tidal 
water, the pressure on the multiple source outlets is higher than on single-source outlets with a high probability of 
the outlets collapsing under high tide.19 In the case of agricultural land, we can capture the variation in expected 
damage by replacing LA as (LAE + LAA), which is the sum of land that adjoins the embankment (LAE) and those at a 
distance (LAA) . However, using the same decomposition for the aquaculture plots can mask the impact of multiple-
plot fisheries on maintenance because, in such cases, while head-enders could reside in plots facing embankments, 
tail-enders may reside in plots at a distance from the embankment. At the same time, households with plots near 
embankments may also have single-source aquaculture farms. In order to circumvent the aggregative impact 
of including aquaculture plots adjoining the embankments, we define a dummy (DS) for plots with canal-based 
aquaculture while including its interaction term with the aquaculture plots near embankments. The latter serves to 
distinguish the impact of canal-based and single-source-based plots on maintenance expenses in the case of plots 
near embankments. It should be noted, however, that all aquaculture farms in distant plots (FA), are located within 
feeder-canal networks. 
To account for the state of embankment we use both the frequency of embankment maintenance activities by 
public institutions (G) like DIW and the Panchayats in the last three years prior to Aila as well as the number 
of events of embankment breach during the same period (E). However, one needs to remain aware of possible 
endogeneity between the past level of maintenance and the current damage, i.e., the current state of embankment 
may well depend on past maintenance by public agencies and private plot owners. However, it can be argued that 
as past damages are observed, households contribution towards embankment maintenance is a ‘current’ decision 
based on ‘past damages’. We include a square term for public expenditure (G2) to account for any non-linearities 
(see equations 4 & 5) and to investigate whether there has been any crowding out of private expenditures.
The return from plots depends on the total operating land (total land owned by the household plus the net leased 
land). The classification of land into fishery and agricultural plots automatically controls for the differential returns 
of these two different land uses. We also control for yield difference by differentiating households on the basis of 
their major income source, which is aquaculture, relative to non-fishery sources like agriculture and other non-farm 
employment. Thus, we include a dummy for the major source of occupation (I), which also serves as a measure 
of the household’s interest in conserving embankments. In order to account for household-specific effects, caste 
dummies (DC) have been included in the model.
20 
19 To date, aquaculture activities in the Sundarbans are traditional in nature so that the system depends on the tidal inflow of water 
carrying carps of different species of fish. After impounding the water, the general practice is to perform stocking for tiger prawn. But 
in general the tidal water is allowed to flow in through the outlets twice a month during the spring tides as then the tidal flow has the 
maximum potential of carrying in seeds for harvesting. On average, for 24 spring tides per annum, the process of water withdrawal and 
release in the tidal river continues more than 100 times through the embankment outlets (personal communication with aquaculture 
owners). Moreover, compared to single source inlets, those that supply to multiple plots are of bigger dimension and, hence, the 
probability of collapse in times of tidal surge is also likely to be higher in the case of the latter.
20 Caste dummies have been incorporated as there were significant variations in land holdings across caste groups. Due to the 
preponderance of Muslim households in the sample, we have considered them as a separate social category just as we treat 
disadvantaged groups like Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes as a separate social category. We have 
merged the ST and OBC categories since they do not have significant variation in land and asset holdings in the study area while taking 
the Hindu general class as the reference category.
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To control for unobserved village fixed effects, we introduce a village-level dummy (DCV) that distinguishes between 
villages on the basis of dominant mode of land use: agriculture and aquaculture. However, as discussed earlier, 
where there are collaborative arrangements in aquaculture, it is possible that in addition to public maintenance 
there is community involvement in embankment conservation. Hence, we define three categories for the 
village dummy: agricultural village with no aquaculture, aquaculture villages with collaborative arrangements for 
embankment maintenance and aquaculture villages without such collective action. In addition, we also include 
block dummies (DB) to capture the inter-regional variations. 
The econometric specification for estimating (11) is thus given as 
kc =β0+β1 LFE+β2 LAE+β3 DS+β4 DS LFE+β5 LFA+β6 LAA+β7 E+β8 G+β9 G
2+β10 I+β11 DC+β12 DCV+β13DB (13)
The variables used in the empirical estimation are described in Table 9.
5. Study Area and Sampling Strategy
The impact of land use on embankment maintenance is best captured in areas where such land transformations 
have been in vogue. To this end, we chose two blocks in the Sundarbans: Sandeshkhali II in North 24 Parganas 
and Basanti from South 24 Parganas. We selected 11 villages from the two blocks: 7 from Sandeshkhali II and 4 
from Basanti.21 The reason for selecting these blocks is that they fall under the high salinity zones (10-20 ppt22) 
and are spatially close (below 22 degrees 20 minutes North) (Saha et al., 1986) and thus are expected to account 
explicitly for the district-specific characteristics of the - sample units, i.e., the households. As mentioned earlier, 
aquaculture activities have a greater spread in North 24 Parganas as compared to South 24 Parganas. Four of the 
seven villages chosen in Sandeshkhali-II (North 24 Parganas block) show extensive aquaculture activities while two 
others have moderate aquaculture practices along with agriculture; only one village in the selection was exclusively 
engaged in agriculture. Of the four villages chosen from Basanti block (South 24 Parganas), two had a dominance of 
aquaculture activities while the other two were engaged exclusively in agriculture. 
In our study, we surveyed 534 households from the chosen villages in the two blocks. Of these, 400 households 
were from the seven villages in Sandeshkhali II while 134 households were from the 4 villages in Basanti. The 
households were randomly selected from the village household listing. 
5.1 Data Description 
We conducted the household survey during the period between November and February of 2009-2010. We 
designed the questionnaire to collect data on the land holdings of households and land use both in terms of the 
number of plots owned as well as the maintenance expenditure on embankments that the respective households 
had incurred in the year just prior to the survey.23 We measured the private contribution towards embankment 
maintenance as the sum of the household’s own labor contributions or his/her monetary contributions towards 
hired labor. Since the labor market in the villages is active, family labor time for maintenance can be computed in 
monetary terms by imputing the daily wage for hired labor locally. The MGNREGA scheme, for example, paid INR 
100 per day for 8 hours of casual unskilled labor. On occasion, there would be costs incurred for material too in 
the form of bamboo shacks and bricks for paving the slope and base of the embankments. Thus, household private 
expenditure can be expressed as a sum of expenditures on labor (one’s own and hired) and the expenses on raw 
materials. We exclude lobbying efforts such as meetings with the panchayat or attempts at persuading public 
agencies such as the Irrigation Department to undertake repairs as these practices are uncommon except during 
extreme events. 
The sample consists of two major occupational classes in terms of the land use practices of households: 
households with agriculture as the major source of income and households whose principal income comes from 
21 Among the 8 gram panchyats in Sandeshkhali II block, the study villages were purposively selected from 4 gram panchayats. The 3 
villages in Basanti were chosen from the 13 gram panchayats in the block. 
22 Ppt stands for particles per thousand.
23 It is to be noted that the area under study was ravaged by Cyclone Aila a few months before the survey. Hence, the maintenance 
expenditure for this period would have been quite different from what a household incurs during a normal year. 
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aquaculture. Of the sampled households, 61 percent owned aquaculture land with or without agricultural land. 
Among the aquaculture households, while 65 percent had canal-based aquaculture, 6 percent had plots drawing 
water from a single source in addition to plots connected to the feeder canal network. Among the aquaculture 
households, 29 percent were under the collective maintenance system for embankments. The maintenance 
expenditures in case of these households were decided at the community level. Here, aquaculture committees 
realize the payments either in the form of fixed fees or amount that is proportional to the landholding in the canal 
aquaculture. However, such collective endeavors are not a widespread practice24 and we exclude these households 
from the estimation sample to isolate individual contribution motives from community level maintenance efforts25. 
Thus, we analyze private maintenance expenditure in a truncated sample of 438 households.
5.2 Land Use, Private Contribution and Public Maintenance: Survey Results 
The distance of the plots from the embankments in relation to their use is reported in Table 2. In villages with 
extensive aquaculture activities, the mean distance of the agricultural plots from the embankments is higher 
than that of the aquaculture plots. This describes to some extent the dynamics of the conversion of paddy fields 
near embankments to aquaculture plots. On the other hand, the distance from the embankment of aquaculture 
plots drawing water from multiple sources is significantly higher than those drawing water from a single source, 
demonstrating the fact that the average distance from the embankments in the case of multiple-source distant plots 
is likely to be higher because they are connected by feeder channels. The sampled households can be catergorized 
in accordance with their land use patterns : households with only agricultural land (36 percent), those with only 
aquaculture (40 percent) and finally households using land for agriculture and aquaculture (24 percent). Table 3 
reports the land holding patterns as well as extent of household expenditure on embankment maintenance across 
these groups of households. The average maintenance expenditure is least for households with only agricultural 
plots compared to households that practices aquaculture. When we compare between households that have both 
aquaculture and agriculture and households with only aquaculture the former appears to make higher average 
contribution for embankments. This may be related to the observed greater average aquacultural landholding 
adjoining the embankments for such households. Higher endowment of risky plots may initiate greater conservation 
efforts. 
The descriptive statistics suggests that aquaculture households spend more on average than non-aquaculture 
households on embankment maintenance, with only 7 percent of households which own agricultural plots 
contributing towards maintenance activities. However, the impact of different aquaculture landholdings, viz., single 
source versus multiple source outlets, on expenditure is yet to be seen. One of the risks facing aquaculture plots 
drawing water from multiple source outlets is that, in the absence of community surveillance of embankment 
maintenance, non-compliance from smaller plot holders and those at the tail could result in under provision of the 
public good. Of course given the non-convexities in the collective good, it is always possible that big landholders 
would undertake the investment on their own irrespective of others’ contribution in order to avoid loss, which in 
the literature is called the ‘Olson Effect’. Similarly, while it is perfectly possible that small landholders relying on 
their subsistence land would contribute even without big landholders to pick up the slack, it would depend on their 
belief regarding the effectiveness of their contribution in arresting the damage (Yoder, 1986; Baland and Platteau, 
1996). In case of multiple source aquaculture,as mentioned earlier, the inlets are of larger dimension and is likely 
to require higher maintenance expenditure. Given the returns from land, the small landholders may find it relatively 
more expensive to manage the embankments privately in an uncoordinated setting. Thus, the observed variation in 
the contribution level of households across villages can be explained in greater details if we control for the different 
interest groups in our sample, namely, aquaculture and non-aquaculture households and for aquaculture households 
by the source of brackish water. 
We report the summary statistics of the explanatory variables of our econometric model in Table 4. The average 
private expenditure on embankment maintenance for aquaculture households is nearly six fold more than that 
24 In the study area we find ample evidences that barring very few exceptions these collective arrangements almost never sustained in the 
long run. In their survey of shrimp farmers in Indian Sundarbans, Philcox et. al (2009) noted that the idea of collective shrimp farming 
doesn’t have strong acceptance among stakeholder groups.
25 However, we retain households within the same village that resorts to individual embankment maintenance. As is evident we also control 
for the presence of community institutions on private expenditure through village dummies.
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for non-aquaculture households. Expenditure on hired labor constitutes the major expenditure share for both the 
groups though for non-aquaculture households the share of family labor in total conservation expenditure (at 21 
percent) is higher than that for aquaculture households (at 6 percent). This substitution of family labor for hired 
labor, together with the lower land-holdings on average, indicates that non-aquaculture households are less wealthy 
than other occupation groups and that lower contributions towards embankment maintenance could be a reflection 
of this wealth effect. Furthermore, since public maintenance has been relatively high for this class of households, 
this too might crowd out private efforts. In order to understand the causal relation in greater detail, it is necessary 
to undertake an econometric estimation of voluntary contributions towards embankment maintenance.
6. Determinants of Voluntary Contribution
6.1 Results
In this section, we present the OLS estimates of (12). However, we also estimate a Tobit model since the 
expenditure on embankment maintenance contains many zero values. In addition, we present Probit estimates 
when the dependent variable is a binary outcome (1 if private contribution is positive and zero otherwise). The 
Probit estimates serve to check for specification errors in the Tobit model.26 Table 5 and 6 report the regression 
results. 
The Probit estimates show that greater the aquaculture plot size that adjoins embankments, greater would be the 
private expenditure on maintenance. As the marginal effects reported in Table 5 show, for every bigha increase in 
aquaculture plots near embankments the likelihood of private contribution increases by 4 percent. On the other 
hand, given plot size and location, the number of past breach events also leads to a significantly higher private 
contribution to embankment maintenance. Interestingly, the marginal effect on the interaction term for canal-
based aquaculture farms is negative and significant. Thus, for every unit increase in plots near embankments which 
belong to multiple-user aquaculture farms, the probit estimates shows that the likelihood of contribution falls by 4 
percentage points. On the other hand, an increase in agricultural land in inundation-prone areas does not have a 
significant impact on the contribution level to maintenance. 
The OLS co-efficients have similar signs when we control for village-specific effects. The Tobit model and its two 
functional variants, linear (Model I) and log-linear (Model II) models, also show similar effects. The Tobit models 
have been estimated for the full sample for all the households owning both aquaculture plots and agricultural plots. 
The linear model predicts the change in the dependent variable for a unit change in the explanatory variable while 
the log-linear model (Model II) predicts the percentage change in the dependent variable for a unit change in the 
independent variable (Table 5). 
The marginal effects of the Tobit regression results suggest that private contribution increases for aquaculture 
plots that adjoin the embankments, the frequency of past embankment breaches, and the amount of land-
holdings other than the “risky” plots near embankments. Thus for a one bigha increase in aquaculture land near 
river embankments, private conservation expenditure increases by INR 121 (or 2.3 percent). The conservation 
expenditure of aquaculture land owners other than those facing embankments increases by INR 43.07 (or 1.6 
percent) per bigha. But the contributions of households owning agricultural land located at a distance from the 
embankments are significant and negative (see Model I). This implies that private contributions decline by INR 261 
for a unit increase in agricultural landholdings located at a distance from the embankments.
These findings are reinforced by the positive marginal effects of the occupation dummy implying that households 
whose major occupation is aquaculture spend INR 1300 compared to non-aquaculture households on embankment 
maintenance. Households owning agricultural plots adjoining the embankments make a significant contribution 
towards embankment maintenance in Model I but it becomes insignificant and even negative in Model II. An 
additional past event of embankment damage increase private contribution by INR 451.75 (or 29 percent). 
26  See Woolridge (2009), pp 446-448.
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A consideration of the impact of government intervention on private efforts shows that, taken together with the 
extent of past damage and plot characteristics, the frequency of public maintenance seems to have an inverted U 
(concave) relation with private contribution efforts. Thus the marginal effect of the frequency of intervention by the 
irrigation department in the last three years is negative and significant while that on its square term is statistically 
significant and positive. For the pooled sample, the turning point is at around 1.21, which implies that if public 
intervention takes place only once in the three year period, there would be less private involvement whereas for 
higher levels of public intervention, there may be a crowding in of individual contributions. We estimate the turning 
point by using coefficient on public maintenance2 x coefficient on the square term on public maintenance  (see Woolridge, 2009, p. 161).
One consistent finding in all the models is that the area of aquaculture plots drawing water from multiple-source 
outlets near embankments has a significant negative impact on private contribution. For every bigha of land using 
multiple-source outlets near embankments, private conservation expenditure falls by almost 1.5 percentage 
points (or INR 73). The exclusion of agricultural households brings the decline in expenditure to INR 96 (or 1.3 
percent) (see Table 6). This suggests that conservation activities in these canal-fed aquaculture farms are lower 
in a decentralized set up. In the case of households having both aquaculture and agricultural land, the area of 
agricultural plots near the embankments shows ambiguous results with the marginal effect positive and showing a 
significant relation in Model 1 but statistically insignificant in Model II. 
6.2 Discussion
Three major results stand out from the estimated models: firstly, faced with a given level of risk, households 
owning aquaculture plots are more likely to contribute to embankment maintenance compared to households with 
only agricultural plots. This contribution, as expected, is positively impacted by the size of both agriculture and 
aquaculture plots near embankments. However, in case of agricultural plots that adjoin the embankments this 
relationship is not consistent. In terms of our theoretical model this phenomenon could be explained as follows: 
given the per unit maintenance cost C'(kc) and damage probability (p), maintenance effort (kc) would be lower in 
land with relatively lower returns and thus with lower expected avoided loss. In fact it may also happen that C'(kc) is 
higher than the expected avoided loss (S'i) at all levels of kc such that equilibrium level of maintenance effort is zero 
(Figure 3). 
Our survey reveals that the mean per-bigha net revenue from paddy cultivation is INR 2,387 (excluding the benefit 
of self-consumption), which is almost eight times less than the average returns from aquaculture practices which 
stands at INR 17, 285.27 At the same time, for the sample as a whole the average embankment maintenance cost 
stands at INR 2,753. Considering the group of households whose major occupation is agriculture, we further 
observe that average agricultural land size adjoining the embankments is 1.78 bigha and here the average 
maintenance expenditure would constitute almost 64 percent of the yield valued at the above mentioned rate. 
But the median land size is little more than half-bigha and in this case the returns would be rather insignificant 
relative to the cost of maintenance. For households with aquaculture as the major source of income, the median 
aquaculture land facing the embankment is 1.5 bigha implying that the returns are in far excess of the average 
maintenance expenditure. 
Next, we see that the size of the aquaculture plots significantly influences private conservation expenditures even 
when they are away from the embankment but a similar effect is not seen in the case of agricultural plots located 
at a distance from the embankments. In aquaculture-dominant areas, the distant agricultural plots are inevitably 
bordered by aquaculture plots so that the owners of agricultural plots appear to be free-riding on the efforts of 
aquaculture-plot owners located closer to the embankment. 
But the question is why aquaculture plots do not similarly free ride. Our analysis does not lead to an unambiguous 
answer but number of possibilities can be scrutinized. Only 6 percent of the sampled households own plots at both 
the head water as well as in the interior. This mutually exclusive land holding pattern could create perverse incentive 
27 This finding tallies with responses yielded in focus group discussions. The average yield from a per-bigha paddy field is about 7 
sacks (where 1 sack = 60 kg). Since one sack is sold at INR 500 per bag, the per-bigha revenue is INR 3,500. With operational costs 
amounting to INR 1,500-2,000 on average, the surplus is INR 1,500-2,000. In contrast, a 15 bigha land of aquaculture leads to yearly 
sales of INR 2,00,000. With operational costs amounting to INR 50,000, the per-bigha profit is INR 10,000. The difference in per-bigha 
profit thus is almost identical to the sample estimates.
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for joint regulation.28 Thus, we can conceive of two independent groups: households with aquaculture plots near the 
river and those with plots in the interior. The average size of plots near embankments (at 11.21 bigha) is significantly 
larger than the size of plots at a distance (at 4.64 bigha). It could be inferred then that wealthier households have 
plots near the embankment while the less wealthy have the interior plots.29 Thus, it is plausible that the owners of 
interior plots participate in maintenance as they might depend for their livelihood on the success of their enterprise 
and therefore face a much stronger subsistence constraint. Although it is logical for head-water households to 
participate in maintenance, those at the tails are probably more risk-averse and hence wish to minimise the risk of 
inundation. Households with more land near the head waters are also better connected socially, able to claim kinship 
with the panchayat leaders and well-connected in terms of memberships in other local networks such as religious 
groups and neighborhood clubs (see Table 7). Thus, it is also possible that these households can impose sanctions 
on the interior land owners. However, further analysis regarding the strategic interdependence (economic as well as 
social) between head-enders and tail-enders are required to validate these claims.
We also found evidence of ‘free-riding’ with regard to canal-based aquaculture for all the model specifications. Free 
riding can be described as the inclination of individual agents to gain from collective activities without making a fair 
contribution of their own (Schneider and Pommerehne, 1981). As canal-based systems involve multiple users, its 
maintenance requires institutional surveillance. Without such institutions, it is to be expected that at least some 
households will shirk their responsibility toward maintenance.30
Moreover, when we analyze aquaculture and agricultural plots together, private and public contributions seem to be 
substitutes. The ‘crowding in’ of private efforts might occur beyond the threshold of 1.21, i.e., at least one public 
maintenance per year. For the sample as a whole, the mean public intervention lies in the range of .25 to .61. 
This suggests that individual conservation efforts are dependent on the initial state of the resource; unless public 
maintenance crosses a critical threshold, private contributions may be less likely (Pagiola, 1993).
However, this leads to another question regarding the perceived behaviour of aquaculture plot owners versus 
agricultural plot owners: if conservation activities in the case of distant aquaculture plot owners might be influenced 
by a subsistence constraint, why does not the same apply to agricultural households who are likely to be even 
poorer? We also need to investigate why these households do not convert their land to aquaculture ponds, choosing 
to keep their lands instead as agricultural lands. 
These questions become all the more pertinent when we consider the fact that aquaculture is relatively more 
profitable than agriculture. It is possible to attribute the choice of land use to risk-aversion or the ability to sustain 
shocks. Not only are households whose aquaculture plots are located near embankments more prone to breach 
event exposure but, from 1994 onwards, they have also been exposed to another production shock in the form of 
the ‘white spot disease’ which has led to high mortality rates in fish species.31 
The ability to cope with such shocks depends upon the wealth of the household. As Table 8 shows, aquaculture 
households, have significantly more land assets. Moreover, since aquaculture households possess higher amounts 
of less risky lands, in the form of land located at a distance from embankments, they may have a buffer to fall 
back upon in case of normal breach events. While, the availability of labor (proxied by the proportion of adult 
members to total members of the household) is significantly higher for non-aquaculture households, the ratio of 
total operational land holding to the number of adult members is significantly higher for aquaculture households.32 
28 As Wade (1987) notes that in case of irrigation canal maintenance if households have plots both near the outlet as well as at the tail end 
of another outlet it could facilitate consensus on the need for rules and joint regulation.
29 However, this argument may not hold if the interior plots are more expensive than plots near embankments. Our plot-level data however 
suggests the opposite: the average price of a plot near the embankments is INR 72,440 per bigha in comparison with INR 62,387.10 per 
bigha for interior plots. The difference is significant at less than 1 percent.
30 In fact, the households that were under community organizations (95 in number) detailed the prevalence of explicit sanctions for failure 
to contribute to embankment maintenance. In most cases, this took the form of cutting the supply of tidal water off from the canals until 
the realization of the fee.
31 53 percent of the sampled households reportedly suffered from one such incidence of fish disease over a recall period of three years 
with 2009 as the reference year. 
32 The average proportion of total land to the number of adult members in the case of aquaculture households is 4.22 whereas it is 2.55 
for non-aquaculture households. The mean difference is significant at less than 5 percent level. Thus, there seems to be a positive 
association between the land-labor ration and contributions to embankment maintenance. This is in accordance with the findings of 
Gaspart et al. (1998), where the ratio of draught animals adjusted by the family labor force has a significant positive relation with private 
contributions to check dam maintenance. We also tested for the mean difference of the livestock adjusted by the adult member of the 
household and obtained similar results. Thus, for households with aquaculture as the major occupation, the mean value of adjusted 
livestock is higher than for non-aquaculture households with the difference significant at less than 5 percent.
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Thus, for households with absolute and relative abundance of land, choosing alternative forms of land use in the 
form of brackish water aquaculture would be the most efficient option if the status–quo land use is less productive. 
The mean proportion of members working in off-farm employment is significantly higher among non-aquaculture 
households in comparison with aquaculture households.33 Thus, for primarily agricultural households with less land 
and livestock endowments but relatively more labor endowments, non-farm employment seems to be the preferred 
option.34 Our results find support in Philcox et. al. (2009) who find significantly higher wealth endowments for 
shrimp farmers relative to agricultural households.
The present study was conducted in the northern areas of the Sundarbans where land conversion from paddy 
to aquaculture is a widespread phenomenon. Thus, it begs the question whether the findings are applicable, for 
instance, to the sea-facing island areas in the Western Sundarbans. While the issue needs empirical verification, 
we could offer certain insights drawing on our theoretical model. Assuming that the marginal effects of private 
conservation efforts on private land related losses are the same across the Sundarbans, the outcome will depend 
on the probability of damage. Using (10), it could be argued that if we characterize the western Sundarbans as 
prone to a higher probability of damage, the bracketed expression would be negative and, hence, will indicate a 
dearth of private efforts in embankment protection. Here, then, a relatively larger public investment may be required 
in order to maintain the stability of the embankments and, thus, minimize, if not prevent, the damage loss from 
breach events. 
7. Conclusions
Our study finds complementarities between returns from land and private conservation expenditures on river 
embankments in the case of the Indian Sundarbans. Households whose principal occupation is aquaculture 
commit more resources to embankment conservation than those in non-aquaculture occupations. We also 
found conservation efforts to increase in all types of aquaculture plots irrespective of the distance from 
embankments, but such efforts unambiguously decrease for agricultural plots that are located at a distance from 
the embankments. However, when we factor in the heterogeneity of resource users within aquaculture households 
(in terms of land-holding), free-riding becomes a possibility in the case of canal-based aquaculture, which involves 
multiple users drawing water from a single source. In such cases, we find tail-enders with lower land-holdings 
contribute more towards embankment maintenance while those at the head-water with greater wealth as well as 
intense social networks free-ride. There is an ambiguity, however, regarding the extent of strategic interdependence 
between the head-enders and tail-enders and the causal mechanism of free riding. Furthermore, when agricultural 
and aquaculture households are taken together, there is some evidence that public intervention in embankment 
maintenance crowds out private efforts.
Our study has implications for public policy with regard to embankment maintenance in the Indian Sundarbans. 
The state has to make a choice between direct expenditures on embankment maintenance or investing in 
productivity enhancement. While an increase in productivity would encourage individual conservation efforts, direct 
subsidization might lead to a crowding out of private contributions in general as well as perpetual inaction on the 
part of agricultural plot holders in particular. Coastal zone regulations that restrict conversion of land use from 
agriculture to shrimp cultivation in the coastal and tidal areas would further discourage private conservation efforts. 
The relation between land productivity and conservation expenditure is modeled in this paper as a static problem. In 
reality this is a dynamic problem as land conversion occurs over time and embankment condition also changes over 
time depending on the extent of public maintenance. Further, since Sundarbans is the largest mangrove ecosystem 
and mangroves are shown to provide crucial storm protection in terms of avoided deaths (Das and Vincent, 2009) 
the interplay between mangrove and embankments needs to be taken into account. Since land use change can also 
cause changes in mangrove vegetation this must also be analyzed in a dynamic setup. This remains an important 
area of future research.
33 The pair-wise correlation coefficient between proportions of agricultural land owned and proportion of household members engaged in 
non-farm employment is positive and significant.
34 Of course, we recognize that land and labor markets are fairly active in the study area and that households always have the option of 
pooling both resources by hiring labor and leasing land. But there exists the possibility that asset-poor households may also be credit-
constrained to make the necessary investments. In keeping with this, the mean area of land taken on lease and the expenses for hired 
labor are significantly higher for the sampled aquaculture households than for households in other occupations. 
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Tables
Table1: Expenditure on Public Embankments (Rs) (1857-58 to 1866-67)
District No. of 
Miles of 
Embankment 
Expenditure 
on Original 
Works (Rs)
Expenditure 
on Repairs 
(Rs)
Total 
(Rs)
Average 
Expenditure
(Rs/mile) 
Average Repair 
Expenditure  
(Rs/mile)*
Burdwan and Hooghly
(Damoodur Division) 
238 130,188 4,44,225 5,74,413 2413.5 1866.492
Midnapore including Tamluk 
and Hidgelee Divisions 
791 7,63,408 10,71,000 18,34,408 2319.1 1353.982
24- Pgs 220 51,017 4,34,685 4,85,702 2207.74 1975.841
Behrampore 80 11,009 65,703 76,714 958.925 821.2875
Rajshahye 05 902 902 180.4 180.4
Maintained by Public Officers at the Expense of the Zamindars 
Midnapore 289.05 4,32,603 4,32,603 43,230 1,497
Sarun 139 59,566
30,375 
59,566
30,375 
5,956
3,937
647.05
Tirchoot 
Behar 1.05 10,937 10,937 1,093 10416.0
Source: Harrison (1875) *own calculation
Note:1 mile=1.61 km
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of the Dependent and Independent Variable
Variables Households with Aquaculture as the 
Major Source of Income
(N=198)
Households with Agriculture and 
Non-aquaculture Activities as the 
Major Source of Income (N=241)
Mean
(S.D.)
Max Min Mean
(S.D.)
Max Min
 Area of Aquaculture Plots That adjoin Embankments 
(bigha)
10.79
(37.70)
400 0 2.39
(18.68)
26 0
Area of Agricultural Plots That adjoin Embankments 
(bigha)
.51
(2.23)
26 0 1.64
(2.930
28 0
Frequency of Exposure to Embankment Breaches in the 
Last Three Years
1.15
(1.41)
6 0 .73
(1.11)
6 0
Frequency of Public Intervention in Last Three Years .27
(.61)
3 0 .61
(.72)
3 0
Area of Aquaculture Plots with Multiple Source Outlets 
(bigha)
11.78
(38.78)
400 0 .62
(3.44)
40 0
Dummy Variable Taking the Value 1 if the Household 
Belongs to Scheduled Caste 0 Otherwise
.17
(.37)
1 0 .39
(.48)
1 0
Dummy Variable Taking the Value 1 if the Household 
Belongs to Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes 
0 Otherwise
.30
(.46)
1 0 .16
(.36)
1 0
Dummy Variable Taking the Value 1 if the Household 
Belongs to General Caste and 0 Otherwise
.05
(.23)
1 0 .11
(.31)
1 0
Dummy Variable Taking the Value 1 if the Household 
Belongs to Muslim Population and 0 Otherwise
.46
(.50)
1 0 .33
(.47)
1 0
Aquaculture Area Operated by Households Other Than 
Those Facing Embankments (bigha)
3.58
(15.41)
162 0 1.40
(11.77)
150 0
Agriculture Area Operated by Households Other Than 
Those Facing Embankments (bigha)
.88
(2.10)
16 0 1.55
(2.11)
12 0
Imputed Wage Bill of Family Labor Employed for 
Embankment Conservation Activities Last Year (INR/
year)
221.25
(635.02)
5,000 0 171.27
(804.65)
6,000 0
Wage Bill of the Hired Labor for Embankment 
Conservation Last Year(INR/year) 
3,372.70
(1,1591.71)
100,000 0 378.21
(2787.56)
30,000 0
Expenditure on Raw Materials Like Brick, Bamboo, etc., 
for Conservation of Embankments Last Year (INR/year)
1,432.15
(5,032.58)
50,000 0 285.71
(2167.84)
30,000 0
Total Private Expenditure (Sum of Wage Bill for Hired 
Labor, Family Labor and Expenditure on Raw Materials) 
(INR/year)
5,284.90
(14,647.00)
120,000 0 859.88
(4325.49)
40,000 0
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Table 5: OLS Probit and Tobit Model for the Full Sample
Variables OLS Regression 
Dependent Variable: 
Private Expenditure on 
Embankment Conservation 
(Rs/year)
Probit Regression 
Dependent Variable: 
(Expenditure=1,0 
otherwise)
Tobit Marginal effects 
Model I Model II 
Coefficients Marginal effects Conditional on being 
Uncensored
Conditional on being 
Uncensored
Aquaculture Area  
Facing Embankments
402.42***
(20)
.04***
(.01)
121.32*** .023***
Aquaculture Area Adjoining 
Embankment x Dummy for 
Multiple Source
-215.84***
(24.23)
-.04***
(.01)
-72.24*** -.015**
Dummy for Multiple 
Source
503.04
(806.11)
.13*
(.08)
364.34 -.085
Aquaculture Area Other 
than Facing Embankment
112.85***
(22.82)
 .013**
(.007)
 43.07*** .016**
Agricultural Area Facing 
Embankment
397.53***
(116.67)
.002
(.011)
160.53* -.02
Agriculture Area Other 
Than Those Facing 
Embankment
-124.77
(146.65)
-.027*
(.015)
-261.57** -.13**
Embankment Breach 415.18*
(250.73)
.05**
(.02)
451.75*** .29**
Public Maintenance -1147.94
 (1150.01)
-.22**
(.11)
-1596.74* -.98**
Public Maintenance Square 541.99 
(529.17)
.08*
(.04)
657.14* .33*
Occupation Dummy 509.17
(798.92)
.09
(.07)
1300.75*** 1.14***
Scheduled Caste Dummy 156.37
(1198.22)
.52***
(.14)
3246.08** 2.60***
Scheduled Tribe and OBC 
Dummy
-.891
(1226.27)
.32 **
(.18)
1108.40 .87*
Muslim Dummy 1709.21
(1150.73)
.36**
(.15)
2863.21** 1.80***
Village Dummy1 
(1=aquaculture and 
Agriculture, 0=otherwise)
193.43
(931.32)
.12
(.08)
1713.16** 1.15**
Village Dummy2 (1= 
Community aquaculture 
and Agriculture, 
0=otherwise)
1315.01
(1181.52)
.59***
(.10)
4611.53*** 3.35***
Block Dummy -422.56
(809.24)
-.46*** 
(.08)
-3135.69*** -2.46***
Constant -1048.82
(1336.84)
N=438,F (16,421)= 51.18***
R2=.64, adj-R2=.66
N=438, LRChi2 (16)= 
217.28*** 
Pseudo R2= .42,Log-
likelihood= -148.96
Obs P:.271 Pred P:.25 (at 
mean)
N=438, LRChi2 (16)=  
266.01***, 
Pseudo R2=.09,326 left 
censored observations 
at 0,112 uncensored 
observations, 
Log-likelihood=- 1294.27
N=438, LRChi2(16)=  
205.64***, 
Pseudo R2=.17,319 left 
censored observations 
at 0,119 uncensored 
observations, 
Log-likelihood=- 477.56
Note:***less than 1 percent level of significance, **less than 5 percent, *less than 10 percent. Figures in Parentheses Show Standard Error
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Table 6: OLS estimates, Marginal Effects of Probit and Logit Models for the Households with 
aquaculture (excluding Households with only agricultural land)
Variables OLS Regression with 
Village Dummies 
Dependent Variable: 
Private Expenditure 
on Embankment 
Conservation (Rs/year)
Probit Regression 
Dependent Variable: 
Binary Variable 
(Expenditure=1,0 
otherwise)
Tobit Estimates 
Model I Model II 
Coefficients Coefficients Conditional on being 
Uncensored
Conditional on being 
Uncensored
Aquaculture Area
Adjoining Embankments
409.62***
(28.92)
.03**
(.04)
147.11*** .017***
Aquaculture Area Adjoining 
Embankment x Dummy for 
Multiple Source
-250.94***
(34.08)
-.03*
(.04)
-96.27*** -.013
Dummy for Multiple Source 788.84 
(1190.01)
-.06
(.13)
-581.88 -.89***
Aquaculture Area Other 
Than Facing Embankment
111.71***
(31.83)
 .009
(.013)
44.89*** .011
Agricultural Area Facing 
Embankment
1048.89***
(253.10)
.008
(.02)
432.59*** .034
Agriculture Area Other Than 
Those Facing Embankment
-273.44 
(286.87)
.008
(.02)
-96.92 .04
Embankment Breach 670.63
(438.50)
.06*
(.08)
574.41** .28**
Public Maintenance -2120.46 
(2265.50)
-.32*
(.44)
-2346.28 -1.06
Public Maintenance Square 731.92
(1004.30)
.08
(.13)
706.99 .19
Occupation Dummy 278.07 
(1528.91)
-.13
(.13)
-903.46 -.39
Scheduled Caste Dummy -947.42 
(2899.55)
.90
(4.74)
4026.50 3.16***
Scheduled Tribe and OBC 
Dummy
111.43 
(1281.47)
.96 
(3.35)
488.88 .56
Muslim Dummy 2781.41 
(2774.71)
.99**
(.60)
4597.48* 2.57**
Village Dummy 
(1=aquaculture and 
Agriculture,0=Collective 
aquaculture and agriculture)
989.77
(1433.98)
-.52***
(.10)
3655.69*** -2.51***
Block Dummy -473.14
(1911.47)
-.52*** 
(.74)
-3561.21*** -2.56***
Constant -1272.76
(3289.11)
N=232, F (15,216)=  
28.62***
R2=.66, adj-R2=.64
N=232, LRChi2 (15)= 
135.99*** 
Pseudo R2=.43, 
Log-likelihood=-91.35
Obs P:.44 Pred P:.41 (at 
mean)
N=232, LRChi2 (15)= 
182.91***, 
Pseudo R2 =.07,136 left 
censored observations 
at 0,96 uncensored 
observations, 
Log-likelihood=- 1092.08
N=232, LRChi2 (15)=  
147.94***, 
Pseudo R2 =.17,136 left 
censored observations 
at 0,96 uncensored 
observations, 
Log-likelihood=- 363.53
Note:***less than 1 percent level of significance, **less than 5 percent, *less than 10 percent. Figures in Parentheses Show Standard 
Error.
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Table 7: Comparison of Social Connectivity of the Sampled Households
Relation with Panchayat Association with 
Political Party
Association in Local 
Networks (Religious 
Groups, Clubs, etc.)
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Aquaculture Area Adjoining Embankments (bigha) 15.37
(5.72)
4.54
(1.32)
5.64
(2.37)
6.18
(1.60)
7.39
(3.21)
5.25
(1.33)
Aquaculture Area Other Than Those Facing 
Embankment (bigha)
1.03
(.40)
2.67
(.74)
2.32
(1.15)
2.57
(.72)
3.97
(1.46)
1.74
(.65)
Note: Figures in Parentheses Show Standard Deviation. Relationship with Panchayat is indicated by a binary variable: 1 if the household 
has any kinship with members or officials of Panchayat, 0 otherwise. Association with political party and social network measured as 
binary variable (1=if the any household member actively participates in rallies meeting, and other party programs and similar activities in 
local networks, 0=otherwise) 1 bigha=.1338 hectare
Table 8: Asset Endowment of Aquaculture and Non-aquaculture Households
Variables /Controls Aquaculture as the 
Major Source of 
Income
(N=198)
Agriculture as 
the Major Source 
of Income
(N=241)
Mean Difference 
Total Operational Land holdings (bigha)
15.36
(3.00)
7.03
(1.41)
(+) and significant at 
less than 1 percent.
Land Other Than Those Facing Embankments (bigha)
4.47
(1.14)
2.95
(.76)
(+)Not Significant
Livestock (number of cattle, dairy animals and poultry) Owned Year 
before Cyclone Aila Expressed in Standard Livestock Unit (SLU)
SLU: Bull=buffalo=1, cow=0.7, duck=poultry=0.02, goat=sheep=0.1
35.13
(7.10)
23.69
(1.75)
(+) and significant at 
less than 5 percent.
Proportion of Household Members in Non-Farm Employment
.15
(.13)
.23
(.16)
(-) and significant at 
less than 1 percent.
Proportion of Adult Member to Total Member 
.58
(.18)
.69
(.21)
(-) and significant at 
less than 1 percent.
Note: Figures in Parentheses Show Standard Deviation. 1 bigha  = .1338 hectare
Table 9: Variable Definitions
Variables Symbols Definition
Aquaculture Area Adjoining Embankments LFE
Aquaculture ponds that adjoin the embankment, so that one border of the 
bond is part of the embankment
Aquaculture area using Multiple Source/
Canal based aquaculture
LFA
Aquaculture ponds that draws tidal water from sources that supplies to 
multiple plots
Aquaculture Area Other than Embankment LFA Aquaculture ponds except those that adjoins the embankment. 
Agricultural Area Adjoining Embankment LAE
Agricultural plots that adjoins the embankment, so that one border of the 
plot is part of the embankment
Agriculture Area Other Than Those Facing 
Embankment
LAA Agricultural plots except those that adjoins the embankment.
Embankment Breach E
Incidence of breach in embankments that affected households crop/output 
in the last three years prior to Aila
Public Maintenance G
Frequency of Government maintenance of embankments in the last three 
years prior to Aila.
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Figures
Source: Department of Irrigation and Waterways, Government of West Bengal 
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Figure 1: Trend of Public Expenditure Embankment Maintenance in Indian Sundarbans
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Figure 3: Determination of Maintenance Efforts for Embankment Maintenance
Map 1: Administrative Map of the Indian Sundarbans
Source: Centre for Science and 
Environment (2012)
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Public and Private Efforts for Conservation of 
River Embankments in Sundarbans
Principal Investigator: Dr. Prasenjit Sarkhel
Department of Economics, University of Kalyani
Name of the Interviewer.......................................................
Date of interview...................................................................
Block : Basanti Block : Sandeshkhali-II
Sampled Villages Census Code Sampled  Villages Census Code 
Sachiakhali 04042700 Atapur 01761500
Ramchandrakhali 04045000 Dhamakhali 01760500
Masjidbati 04045500 Dwarirjangal 01761000
Chunakhali 04042300 Bermajur 01760700
Jhupkhali 01760600
Sitalia 01761400
Annexes
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0. Household Identification
1. Block.................................................................
2. Thana...............................................................
3. Village................................................................
4. Hamlet.............................................................
5. Names of Household Head................................................................
6. Name of the respondent...............................................................
7. Relationship with Household Head............................................................ 
8. Househopld Religion (code)..........................................................
9. Household Caste (code).................
Code List
7 8
Hindu...1
Muslim.....2
Christian....3
Others....4
SC......1
ST.....2
OBC...3
GEN....4
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1. Household Member Information
1.1 1.2. 1.3. 1.4. 1.5. 1.6. 1.7. 1.8. 1.9 2.0
HH
Member
Id.
Name Sex
(Code)
Age Relationship
with 
Panchayat 
(Code)
 
Education
(Highest 
level of 
Education)
(Code)
General 
Education
 (Code)
Occupation Remittances/
Transfers
None....0
Money sent....1
Money 
received....2
Participation of the HH 
members in groups and 
Networks
Main 
Source 
of 
Income
Others 1. Groups where 
members participate 
actively (Code)
2. Duration of 
memebership in each 
group
1 2
1.3 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.0
Male....1
Female...2
Panchayat Pradhan....1
Panchayat Samiti....2
Panchayat memeber....3
Husban/Wif...4
Son/Daughter5
Brother /Sister...6
Son inlaw/Daughter in 
Law...7
Other Relatives....11
Close Neighbour....12
Same political party...13
Others....14
Illiterate..1 
Less than Primary....2
Less than Class 103
School Leaving ....4
Less than Higher 
Secondary...5
Higher Secondary 6
Less than 
Graduation....7
Graduate...8
Post graduate…9
Adult Education…10
Vocational training…11
Cannot read or 
Write1
Can sign....2
Can only 
read....3
Can read or 
Write....4
Own fishery...1,
Own Agricultural 
land....2,
Agricultural 
labour....3,
Fishery labour....4, 
Business...5 
Daily labour....8
Others…9
Club....1
Puja Committee2
Masjid Committee3
Political party....4
NG....5
Farmers Cooperative....6
Fishery Committeee....7
Business Association....8
Bazaar Committeee...9
School Committee...10
SHG...11
Others...12
Enumerators Fill up
HH Member No
1 <12 years
2 Adult Male
3 Adult Female
4 Old Male/Female
5 Total earning member
6 Total Household member
South Asian Network for Development and Environmental Economics28
2.
  
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t I
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
of
 H
ou
se
ho
ld
 m
em
be
rs
 fo
r t
he
 p
as
t o
ne
 y
ea
r (
Fo
r m
em
be
rs
 a
bo
ve
 1
2 
ye
ar
s)
2.
1
2.
2
2.
3
H
H
 
Id
.
O
w
n 
fa
rm
 W
or
k/
O
w
n 
Bu
si
ne
ss
Pa
st
 1
 y
ea
r B
ef
or
e 
Ai
la
...
.1
Af
te
r A
ila
 to
 th
e 
Ti
m
e 
of
 S
ur
ve
y.
..2
O
ff 
fa
rm
 w
or
k/
 C
on
tr
ac
tu
al
 w
or
k 
Pa
st
 1
 y
ea
r B
ef
or
e 
Ai
la
 1
Af
te
r A
ila
 to
 th
e 
Ti
m
e 
of
 S
ur
ve
y 
...
.2
2.
2.
1
2.
2.
2
2.
2.
3
2.
2.
4
2.
3.
1
2.
3.
2
2.
3.
3
2.
3.
4
2.
3.
5
2.
3.
6
W
or
k
(C
od
e)
Av
er
ag
e 
D
ai
ly
 
La
bo
ur
 H
ou
r  
(H
rs
) 
W
or
kd
ay
s 
pe
r 
w
ee
k
N
o.
 o
f M
on
th
s
W
or
k
 (C
od
e)
Rs
.
Av
er
ag
e 
D
ai
ly
 
La
bo
ur
 H
ou
r 
D
ay
…
1
W
ee
k.
..2
M
on
th
...
3
Ye
ar
…
4
O
th
er
s.
...
5
W
or
kd
ay
s 
pe
r 
w
ee
k
M
on
et
ar
y 
Va
lu
e(
Rs
.)
N
o.
 o
f M
on
th
s 
D
ay
 1
W
ek
 2
M
on
th
...
3
Ye
ar
 4
O
th
er
s.
...
5
Sa
la
ry
/W
ag
e 
re
ce
iv
ed
 (R
s.
)
N
on
-m
on
et
ar
y 
th
in
ga
 re
ci
ve
d 
in
 K
in
d
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
2.
2 
an
d 
2.
3
Cu
lti
va
to
r..
.1
Ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l L
ab
ou
r..
.2
Fi
sh
er
y 
O
w
ne
r..
.3
Fi
sh
er
y 
La
bo
ur
...
4
Br
ic
k 
Ki
ln
 O
w
ne
r..
..5
Br
ic
k 
Ki
ln
 L
ab
ou
r..
.6
Fr
ui
t P
ro
du
ct
io
n.
..7
Ta
ilo
r..
.8
Jw
el
le
r..
.9
Bl
ac
ks
m
ith
...
.1
0
M
ec
ha
ni
c.
..1
1
Sm
al
l B
us
in
es
s 
(S
m
al
l s
ho
p)
...
.1
2
M
ed
iu
m
 B
us
in
ee
ss
 (W
ho
le
sa
le
 tr
ad
er
)..
.1
3
Re
at
ile
r/
St
oc
ki
st
...
14
Ca
r/
Bu
s/
Tr
uc
k 
D
riv
er
...
15
O
th
er
 V
eh
ic
le
 D
riv
er
...
.1
6
Co
ns
tr
uc
tio
n 
w
or
ke
r»
...
.1
7
D
ai
ly
 L
ab
ou
r..
.1
8
N
RE
G
A 
W
or
k.
..2
0
G
ov
er
nm
en
t J
ob
...
21
Pr
iv
at
e 
Se
ct
or
 Jo
b2
2
Pe
ns
io
ne
r..
.2
3
M
ai
d/
H
ou
se
ho
ld
 H
el
p.
...
24
O
th
er
s.
..2
6
En
um
er
at
or
s 
Fi
ll 
up
W
or
k
To
ta
l O
f F
ar
m
 In
co
m
e 
(R
s.
)
To
ta
l l
ab
ou
r 
da
ys
 in
 N
RE
G
A
To
ta
l I
nc
om
e 
fr
om
 N
RE
G
A
 (R
s.
)
Pa
st
 1
 y
ea
r 
Be
fo
re
 A
ila
A
ft
er
 A
ila
 t
o 
th
e 
Ti
m
e 
of
 S
ur
ve
y
29
Examining Private Participation in Embankment Maintenance in the Indian Sundarbans
3.
 O
pe
ra
ti
on
al
 H
ol
di
ng
s 
of
 th
e 
H
H
3.
1
3.
2
3.
3
3.
4
3.
5
3.
6
Pl
ot
 N
o.
Lo
ca
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
Pl
ot
 
Pl
ot
Ar
ea
Bi
gh
a.
...
1 
Ko
tt
ah
...
.2
O
w
ne
rs
hi
p
La
nd
(C
od
e)
Pa
st
 O
ne
 y
ea
r t
ill
Ai
la
...
1
Af
te
r A
ila
Ti
ll 
Su
rv
ey
...
2
M
ar
ke
t
Ra
te
O
f t
he
pl
ot
 (C
od
e)
Pa
st
 O
ne
 y
ea
r t
ill
Ai
la
...
1
Af
te
r A
ila
Ti
ll 
Su
rv
ey
...
2
La
nd
 U
se
(C
od
e)
 
 P
as
t O
ne
 y
ea
r t
ill
Ai
la
...
1
Af
te
r A
ila
Ti
ll 
Su
rv
ey
...
2
1
2
 H
am
le
t
Lo
ca
tio
n 
w
ith
 re
sp
ec
t t
o 
ne
ar
es
t d
yk
e
2.
1
2.
2
2.
3
2.
4
2.
5
D
ire
ct
io
n
of
 th
e 
Pl
ot
(C
od
e)
 
D
is
ta
nc
e
Fr
om
 
ne
ar
es
t
dy
ke
(m
/k
m
)
Ti
m
e 
ta
ke
n 
by
an
 a
du
lt 
m
al
e
of
 g
en
er
al
 h
ea
lth
 
to
 re
ac
h 
th
e 
ne
ar
es
t 
dy
ke
 (m
in
)
W
he
th
er
Bo
un
da
ry
 o
f t
he
Pl
ot
 fa
ce
s 
dy
ke
on
  a
ny
 s
id
e
Ye
s.
...
1
N
o.
...
0
D
yk
e
ty
pe
 (C
od
e)
Ar
ea
U
ni
t
1
2
1
2
1
2
2.
1
2.
5
3.
5
3.
6
Ea
st
1
W
es
t..
.2
N
or
th
...
3
So
ut
h.
...
.4
N
or
th
-e
as
t5
So
ut
h-
ea
st
6
N
or
th
-w
es
t7
So
ut
h-
w
es
t..
..8
M
ud
 e
m
ba
nk
m
en
t..
..1
M
ud
  e
m
ba
nk
m
en
t w
ith
 b
ric
k
pi
tc
hi
ng
...
.2
Pu
rc
ha
se
d 
La
nd
...
1
In
he
rit
ed
 L
an
d.
..2
Le
as
ed
 in
...
4
Le
as
ed
 o
ut
…
5
Ba
rg
a.
...
5
Ry
ot
i..
.6
Ag
ric
ul
tu
re
...
.1
Sa
lt 
w
at
er
 fi
sh
er
y.
..2
Sw
ee
t w
at
er
 fi
sh
er
y.
...
3
Br
ic
k 
Ki
ln
...
.5
Fa
llo
w
...
.6
H
or
tic
ul
tu
re
...
.7
O
rc
ha
rd
...
..8
En
um
er
at
or
s 
Fi
ll 
U
p
N
o.
La
nd
 U
se
Bi
gh
a
Sa
ta
k
1
To
ta
l A
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l P
lo
t
2
To
ta
l F
is
he
ry
 P
lo
t
3
To
ta
l L
ea
se
d 
in
 L
an
d
4
O
pe
ra
tio
na
l H
ol
di
ng
 (1
+2
+3
)
5
Ar
ea
 o
f t
he
 p
lo
t d
ire
ct
ly
 fa
ci
ng
 ri
ve
r e
m
ba
nk
m
en
ts
6
Co
nt
ig
uo
us
 p
lo
t
4.
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t A
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l L
an
d 
fo
r t
he
 p
as
t 1
2 
m
on
th
s
4.
1
4.
2
4.
3
4.
4
4.
5
Pl
ot
 N
o.
Cr
op
(c
od
e)
 
 
Cr
op
pe
d 
La
nd
 (%
)
To
ta
l L
ab
ou
r H
ou
r u
se
d 
in
 th
e 
pl
ot
Pa
st
 O
ne
 y
ea
r t
ill
 A
ila
...
1
Af
te
r A
ila
 T
ill
 S
ur
ve
y.
..2
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 fo
r 
se
ed
,fe
rt
ili
ze
r a
nd
 
eq
ui
pm
en
ts
 (R
s.
)
Pa
st
 O
ne
 y
ea
r t
ill
Ai
la
...
1
Af
te
r A
ila
Ti
ll 
Su
rv
ey
...
2
1
2
3
4
Fa
m
ily
 L
ab
ou
r
H
ire
d
la
bo
ur
(lo
ca
l) 
H
ire
d
(O
ut
si
de
r)
To
ta
l e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 fo
r h
ire
d 
la
bb
ou
r (
ki
nd
+c
as
h)
 (R
s.
)
N
o.
 o
f l
ab
ou
r h
rs
H
H
 Id
.
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
2
4.
2
Au
s.
..1
Am
an
...
2
Bo
ro
...
3
Co
tto
n.
..4
Po
ta
to
 5
M
us
ta
rd
...
.6
Ve
ge
ta
bl
es
...
7
If 
th
er
e 
is
 m
ul
tip
le
 c
ro
pp
in
g 
in
 a
 s
in
gl
e 
pl
ot
 m
en
tio
n 
in
 d
iff
er
en
t r
ow
s
1 
m
on
=4
0 
Kg
31
Examining Private Participation in Embankment Maintenance in the Indian Sundarbans
5.
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t A
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l p
ro
du
ct
io
n
5.
1
5.
2
5.
3
5.
4
5.
5
Pl
ot
 n
o.
Cr
op
s
(c
od
e 
fro
m
 4
)
Am
ou
nt
 o
f c
ro
p 
ha
rv
es
te
d
Pa
st
 O
ne
 y
ea
r t
ill
 A
ila
...
1
Af
te
r A
ila
 T
ill
 S
ur
ve
y.
..2
Am
ou
nt
 o
f m
ar
ke
te
d 
Cr
op
s
Pa
st
 O
ne
 y
ea
r t
ill
 A
ila
...
1
Af
te
r A
ila
 T
ill
 S
ur
ve
y.
..2
Th
e 
m
on
et
ar
y 
va
lu
e 
of
 
ha
rv
es
t m
is
se
d 
du
e 
to
 
Ai
la
 (R
s.
)
Am
ou
nt
U
ni
t
M
on
..1
 B
as
ta
2 
Kg
...
.3
 
Am
ou
nt
U
ni
t
M
on
..1
 B
as
ta
2 
Kg
...
.3
 
In
co
m
e 
fro
m
 m
ar
ke
te
d 
cr
op
s
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
Co
nv
er
t b
as
ta
 /
m
on
 in
to
 k
g
5.
2
Au
s.
..1
Am
an
...
2
Bo
ro
...
3
Co
tto
n.
..4
Po
ta
to
 5
M
us
ta
rd
...
.6
Ve
ge
ta
bl
es
...
7
En
um
er
at
or
s 
fil
l u
p
In
co
m
e 
fro
m
 m
ar
ke
te
d 
cr
op
s 
be
fo
re
 A
ila
 (R
s.
)
Va
lu
e 
of
 H
ar
ve
st
 lo
st
 d
ue
 to
 A
ila
 (R
s.
)
N
o.
 o
f m
ul
tic
ro
pp
ed
 p
lo
ts
Am
ou
nt
 o
f m
ul
tic
ro
pp
ed
 p
lo
ts
 (b
ig
ha
)
South Asian Network for Development and Environmental Economics32
6.
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t l
ea
se
d 
ou
t l
an
d
6.
1
6.
2
6.
3
6.
4
6.
5
6.
6
6.
7
Pl
ot
 n
o.
Pr
es
en
t L
an
d 
U
se
Le
as
e 
ra
te
Ti
m
e 
si
nc
e 
le
as
ed
 o
ut
 y
ea
r1
 
M
on
th
...
2
U
se
 o
f l
an
d 
be
fo
re
 le
as
e
Lo
ca
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
pl
ot
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t t
he
 le
ss
e
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
An
nu
al
 le
as
e 
(R
s.
/b
ig
ha
)
te
nu
re
(y
rs
)
U
ni
t
N
o.
 o
f y
rs
/
m
on
th
H
am
le
t
D
is
ta
nc
e 
fro
m
 
th
e
N
ea
re
st
 
em
ba
nk
m
en
t 
(m
/k
m
)
Ti
m
e
Ta
ke
n
by an
 a
du
lt
m
al
e
of
 g
en
er
al
he
al
th
to
 re
ac
h 
th
e 
ne
ar
es
t 
dy
ke
 (m
in
)
W
he
th
er
Bo
un
da
ry
 
of
 th
e
Pl
ot
fa
ce
s
dy
ke
on
  a
ny
si
de
Ye
s.
...
1
N
o.
...
0
D
yk
e
ty
pe
 (C
od
e 
Pl
ac
e 
of
 
or
ig
in
(c
od
e)
So
ci
o-
ec
on
om
ic
 
co
nd
iti
on
(c
od
e)
6.
2
6.
5
6.
6/
5
6.
7/
1
6.
7/
2
Ag
ric
ul
tu
re
...
.1
Sa
lt 
w
at
er
 fi
sh
er
y.
..2
Sw
ee
t w
at
er
 fi
sh
er
y.
...
3
Br
ic
k 
Ki
ln
...
.5
Fa
llo
w
...
.6
H
or
tic
ul
tu
re
...
.7
O
rc
ha
rd
...
..8
Ag
ric
ul
tu
re
...
.1
Sa
lt 
w
at
er
 fi
sh
er
y.
..2
Sw
ee
t w
at
er
 fi
sh
er
y.
...
3
Br
ic
k 
Ki
ln
...
.5
Fa
llo
w
...
.6
H
or
tic
ul
tu
re
...
.7
O
rc
ha
rd
...
..8
M
ud
 e
m
ba
nk
m
en
t..
..1
M
ud
  e
m
ba
nk
m
en
t w
ith
 b
ric
k 
pi
tc
hi
ng
...
.2
Sa
m
e 
Vi
lla
ge
...
.1
Sa
m
e 
di
st
ric
t o
th
er
 v
ill
ag
e.
..2
O
th
er
 d
is
tr
ic
ts
...
3
To
w
n4
Ri
ch
...
1 
Sa
m
e 
st
au
s.
...
2 
po
or
...
.3
En
um
er
at
or
s 
fil
l u
p
Le
as
ed
 o
ut
 la
nd
 b
ef
or
e 
Ai
la
 (b
ig
ha
)
Le
as
ed
 o
ut
 la
nd
 a
fte
r A
ila
 (b
ig
ha
)
La
nd
 u
se
 b
ef
or
e 
Ai
la
 (c
od
e)
La
nd
 U
se
 a
fte
r A
ila
 (c
od
e)
33
Examining Private Participation in Embankment Maintenance in the Indian Sundarbans
7.
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t l
ea
se
d 
in
 L
an
d
7.
1
7.
2
7.
3
7.
4
7.
5
7.
6
7.
7
Pl
ot
 n
o.
Le
as
e 
Te
nu
re
/r
at
e
H
ow
 m
an
y 
ye
ar
s 
si
nc
e 
ta
ke
n
le
as
e
La
nd
 u
se
 b
ef
or
e 
le
as
ed
 in
 (c
od
e)
In
fo
rm
ati
on
 a
bo
ut
 t
he
 o
w
ne
r 
w
ho
 
le
as
ed
 o
ut
 t
he
 la
nd
W
he
th
er
 in
te
re
st
ed
 in
 
re
ne
w
in
g 
le
as
e
ye
s.
...
1
no
..2
If
 n
o 
th
en
 n
ex
t 
co
lu
m
n
¢R
ea
so
n 
fo
r 
no
n-
re
ne
w
al
Pr
es
en
t 
is
 n
ot
 p
ro
fit
ab
le
...
..1
Lo
ss
 d
ue
 t
o 
A
ila
...
..2
O
th
er
s.
...
3
1
2
3
4
1
2
An
nu
al
Le
as
e 
ra
te
 (R
s.
/
bi
gh
a)
Le
as
e
te
nu
re
(y
rs
)
U
ni
t
Yr
..1
 m
on
th
...
2
Am
ou
nt
Pl
ac
e 
of
 O
rg
in
(c
od
e)
So
ci
o-
ec
on
om
ic
 
co
nd
iti
on
(c
od
e)
7.
4
7.
5/
1
7.
5/
2
Ag
ric
ul
tu
re
...
.1
Sa
lt 
w
at
er
 fi
sh
er
y.
..2
Sw
ee
t w
at
er
 fi
sh
er
y.
...
3
Br
ic
k 
Ki
ln
...
.5
Fa
llo
w
...
.6
H
or
tic
ul
tu
re
...
.7
O
rc
ha
rd
...
..8
Sa
m
e 
Vi
lla
ge
...
.1
Sa
m
e 
di
st
ric
t o
th
er
 v
ill
ag
e.
..2
O
th
er
 d
is
tr
ic
ts
...
3
To
w
n4
Ri
ch
...
1 
Sa
m
e 
st
au
s.
...
2 
po
or
...
.3
En
um
er
at
or
s 
fil
l u
p
Le
as
ed
 in
 la
nd
 b
ef
or
e 
Ai
la
 (b
ig
ha
)
Le
as
ed
 in
 la
nd
 a
fte
r A
ila
 (b
ig
ha
)
La
nd
 u
se
 b
ef
or
e 
Ai
la
 (c
od
e)
La
nd
 U
se
 a
fte
r A
ila
 (c
od
e)
South Asian Network for Development and Environmental Economics34
8.
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t l
iv
es
to
ck
 in
 H
H
8.
1
8.
2
8.
3
Li
ve
st
oc
k
N
um
be
r o
f L
iv
es
to
ck
Pr
es
en
t v
al
ue
 o
f t
he
 li
ve
st
oc
k 
(R
s.
)
If 
pu
rc
ha
se
d 
le
ss
 th
an
 1
 y
ea
r t
he
 a
ct
ua
l v
al
ue
...
.1
If 
pu
rc
ha
se
d 
m
or
e 
th
an
 1
 y
ea
r t
he
 p
re
se
nt
 v
al
ue
 ..
..2
Li
ve
st
oc
k 
be
fo
re
 A
ila
(R
s.
)
Pr
es
en
t
Li
ve
st
oc
k 
af
te
r A
ila
(R
s.
)
Be
fo
re
 A
ila
 in
 th
e 
pa
st
 o
ne
 y
ea
r
O
x/
bu
ffa
lo
Co
w
G
oa
t
Sh
ee
p
H
en
Co
ck
D
uc
k
Pi
g En
um
er
ta
to
rs
 fi
ll 
up
Va
lu
e 
of
 li
ve
st
oc
k 
lo
st
 d
ue
 to
 A
ila
 (R
s.
)
35
Examining Private Participation in Embankment Maintenance in the Indian Sundarbans
9.
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t a
ss
et
s 
an
d 
w
ea
lt
h 
of
 H
H
9.
1 
Am
ou
nt
 o
f T
ot
al
 la
nd
 o
w
ne
d 
be
fo
re
 A
ila
 (b
ig
ha
)..
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
9.
2 
Am
ou
nt
 o
f l
an
d 
af
te
r A
ila
 th
at
 is
 lo
st
 in
 ri
ve
r (
bi
gh
a)
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
..
9.
3 
Am
ou
nt
 o
f l
an
d 
no
t u
sa
bl
e 
an
y 
m
or
e 
du
e 
to
 s
al
in
ity
 a
nd
 /
or
 s
ilt
at
iti
on
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
.
9.
4 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t d
w
el
lin
g 
N
o.
 o
f D
w
el
lin
g
Ty
pe
 o
f D
w
el
lin
g
M
ud
 h
ou
se
 w
ith
 th
at
ch
ed
 ro
of
...
1
M
u 
dH
ou
se
 w
ith
 T
ile
d 
ro
of
/a
sb
es
to
s/
tin
 ro
of
...
.2
Pu
cc
a 
H
ou
se
...
...
3
Im
pa
ct
 d
ue
 to
 A
ila
Fu
lly
 d
am
ag
ed
...
.1
Pa
rt
ia
lly
 D
am
ag
e.
..2
Pr
es
en
t V
al
ue
 o
f t
he
 D
w
el
lin
g 
 9.
5 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t o
th
er
 a
ss
et
s 
As
se
ts
N
o.
 o
f a
ss
et
s 
be
fo
re
 A
ila
N
o.
 o
f A
ss
et
s 
af
te
r A
ila
Es
tim
at
ed
 M
ar
ke
t V
al
ue
 o
f a
ss
et
s 
lo
st
 in
 A
ila
(R
s.
)
D
es
i b
oa
t
En
gi
ne
 d
riv
en
 b
oa
t
M
ot
or
 c
yc
le
Bi
-c
yc
le
En
gi
ne
 d
riv
en
 v
an
ra
di
o
M
ob
ile
/l
an
dl
in
e
w
at
ch
Se
w
in
g 
m
ac
hi
ne
O
th
er
 A
ss
et
s
a)
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
..
b)
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
c)
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
..
South Asian Network for Development and Environmental Economics36
10
. I
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t fi
sh
er
y 
pl
ot
s
10
.1
10
.2
10
.3
10
.4
Pl
ot
 N
o.
So
ur
ce
of
 b
ra
ck
is
h
at
er
 (c
od
e)
Ye
ar
 s
in
ce
 in
 fi
sh
er
y 
bu
si
ne
ss
Yr
…
1 
M
on
th
...
2
W
he
th
er
 th
e 
Bh
er
i i
s 
lic
en
se
d 
to
 a
ny
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t a
ge
nc
y
ye
s.
...
1
N
o.
..2
U
ni
t
am
ou
nt
10
.2
Sl
ui
ce
 G
at
e.
...
1
Pi
pe
...
.2
Ri
ve
rin
e 
ca
na
ls
...
.3
Fr
om
 o
th
er
 fi
sh
er
y 
ow
ne
rs
...
.4
37
Examining Private Participation in Embankment Maintenance in the Indian Sundarbans
11
. P
ro
du
ct
io
n 
an
d 
co
st
 d
et
ai
ls
 o
f F
is
he
ry
11
.1
11
.2
11
.3
11
.4
11
.5
11
.6
Pl
ot
 n
o.
Fi
sh
(c
od
e)
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t 
m
ar
ke
te
d 
fis
h
Pa
st
 O
ne
 y
ea
r t
ill
 
Ai
la
...
1
Af
te
r A
ila
 T
ill
 S
ur
ve
y.
..2
La
bo
ur
 d
ay
s 
in
 F
is
he
ry
 in
 
th
e 
pa
st
 y
ea
r
Pa
st
 O
ne
 y
ea
r t
ill
 A
ila
...
1
Af
te
r A
ila
 T
ill
 S
ur
ve
y.
..2
O
th
er
 e
xp
en
se
s
Pr
od
uc
tio
n
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
(c
od
e)
1
2
3
se
ed
Li
m
e/
fe
rt
ili
ze
r/
in
se
tic
id
es
Al
ag
ha
r
(c
od
e)
un
it
Va
lu
e 
(R
s.
)
Am
ou
nt
 o
f h
ar
ve
st
(k
g)
In
co
m
e 
fro
m
m
ar
ke
te
d 
fis
h 
(R
s.
)
Fa
m
ily
 la
bo
ur
H
ire
d
(lo
ca
l)
hi
re
d
(o
ut
si
de
r)
To
ta
l 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 fo
r 
hi
re
d 
la
bo
ur
(c
as
h+
ki
nd
) (
Rs
.)
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
11
.2
11
.5
/3
11
.6
Ba
gd
a…
1
G
al
da
…
2
Bh
et
ki
...
.3
Pa
rs
e.
...
.4
Bh
an
ga
r..
...
5
O
th
er
 s
m
al
l fi
sh
...
.6
O
th
er
 b
ig
 fi
sh
...
..7
If 
co
ns
tr
uc
te
d 
w
ith
in
 1
 y
ea
r t
he
 a
ct
ua
l v
al
ue
...
.1
If 
co
ns
tr
uc
te
d 
le
ss
 m
or
e 
th
an
 1
 y
ea
r t
he
 p
re
se
nt
 v
al
ue
...
.2
Tr
ad
iti
on
al
…
1
Ad
vi
ce
 fr
om
 F
EO
…
2
N
G
O
 a
dv
ic
e.
..4
O
th
er
s.
...
5
En
um
er
at
or
s 
fil
l u
p
To
ta
l i
nc
om
e 
fro
m
 fi
sh
er
y 
in
 th
e 
pa
st
 1
 y
ea
r b
ef
or
e 
Ai
la
(R
s.
)
To
ta
l I
nc
om
e 
fro
m
 fi
sh
er
y 
af
te
r A
ila
 ti
ll 
su
rv
ey
(R
s.
)
To
ta
l e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 o
n 
hi
re
d 
la
bo
ur
 b
ef
or
e 
Ai
la
(R
s.
)
To
ta
l e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 o
n 
hi
re
d 
la
bo
ur
 a
fte
r A
ila
 ti
ll 
su
rv
ey
(R
s.
)
N
o.
 o
f d
ay
s 
af
te
r A
ila
 th
e 
fir
st
 h
ar
ve
st
 o
bt
ai
ne
d
South Asian Network for Development and Environmental Economics38
13
. I
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t e
m
ba
nk
m
en
t b
re
ca
he
s
13
.1
13
.2
13
.3
13
.4
Pl
ot
 N
o.
N
um
be
r o
f t
im
es
 in
 th
e 
la
st
 th
re
e 
ye
ar
s 
th
e 
pl
ot
 w
as
 a
ffe
ct
ed
 fr
om
 
Em
ba
nk
m
en
t D
am
ag
e
 N
at
ur
e 
an
d 
Ex
te
nt
 o
f D
am
ag
e 
m
os
tly
 s
ee
n 
in
 th
e 
la
st
 th
re
e 
ye
ar
s
N
at
ur
e 
an
d 
Ex
te
nt
 o
f D
am
ag
e 
du
e 
to
 A
ila
1
2
3
1
2
3
Ty
pe
 o
f D
am
ag
e 
in
 th
e 
ne
ar
es
t D
yk
e 
(c
od
e)
M
ax
im
um
 h
ei
gh
t
of
 w
at
er
 lo
gg
in
g(
ft
)
D
ay
s 
in
un
da
te
d
Ty
pe
 o
f D
am
ag
e 
in
 th
e 
ne
ar
es
t D
yk
e
M
ax
im
um
 h
ei
gh
t
of
 w
at
er
 lo
gg
in
g(
ft
)
D
ay
s 
in
un
da
te
d
13
.3
/1
 &
 1
3.
4/
1
Su
bs
id
en
ce
 o
f E
m
ba
nk
m
en
t..
...
1
Em
ba
nk
m
en
t B
re
ac
h.
...
2
Ti
da
l w
at
er
 s
pi
llo
ve
r e
m
ba
nk
m
en
ts
...
..3
Fo
r e
nu
m
er
at
or
s:
 C
on
si
de
r b
ot
h 
ag
ric
ul
tu
re
 a
nd
 fi
sh
er
y 
pl
ot
s 
al
on
g 
w
ith
 le
as
ed
 in
 p
lo
ts
12
. P
ro
bl
em
s 
of
 V
ir
us
 In
fe
ct
io
n
12
1
12
.2
Pl
ot
 n
o.
N
o.
 o
f t
im
es
 th
e 
ha
rv
es
t g
ot
 a
ffe
ct
ed
 b
y 
vi
ru
s 
in
fe
ct
io
n 
in
 th
e 
pa
st
 1
 y
ea
r 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
of
 v
iru
s 
in
fe
ct
io
n
Es
tim
at
ed
 L
os
s 
(R
s.
)
39
Examining Private Participation in Embankment Maintenance in the Indian Sundarbans
14
. P
ub
lic
 a
nd
 P
ri
va
te
 A
ct
io
n 
fo
r e
m
ba
nk
m
en
t c
on
se
rv
at
io
n
14
..1
.
14
.2
.
14
.3
.
14
.4
. 
Pl
ot
 N
o.
H
ow
 m
an
y 
tim
es
 in
 th
e 
la
st
 3
 y
ea
rs
 th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
pu
bl
ic
 a
ge
nc
ie
s 
m
ai
nt
ai
ne
d 
th
e 
ne
ar
es
t e
m
ba
nk
m
en
t t
o 
yo
ur
 p
lo
t.
1.
H
H
 e
ffo
rt
 fo
r d
yk
e 
co
ns
er
va
tio
n 
(c
od
e)
2.
Po
rt
io
n 
of
 e
m
ba
nk
m
en
t c
on
se
rv
ed
 (c
od
e)
Re
pa
ir 
of
 E
m
ba
nk
m
en
ts
 n
ea
re
st
 to
 y
ou
r p
lo
t a
fte
r A
ila
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
of
 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
Ag
en
cy
Irr
ig
at
io
n.
...
1
Pa
nc
ha
ya
t 
th
ro
ug
hN
RE
G
A.
..2
Pa
nc
ha
ya
t t
hr
ou
gh
 
ot
he
r f
un
d.
...
.3
Pr
iv
at
e 
eff
or
t
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
In
 la
st
 3
 y
ea
rs
Po
rt
io
n 
co
ns
er
ve
d
1. N
o.
of
 d
ay
s 
af
te
r 
Ai
la
 th
e 
re
pa
ir 
w
or
k 
st
ar
te
d
2 
Fi
rs
t
Re
pa
ir 
w
or
ks
 d
on
e 
by
 w
ho
m
. (
co
de
)
.
3.
D
id
 y
ou
 p
er
so
na
lly
 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
ed
 in
 th
e 
re
pa
ir 
w
or
ks
4.
 H
H
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n 
(c
od
e)
 
14
.3
/1
14
.3
/2
14
.4
/2
14
..4
/4
Pe
rs
on
al
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
to
 P
an
ch
ay
at
...
..1
Pe
tit
io
n 
in
 G
ro
up
...
..2
M
ud
 p
at
ch
in
g 
by
 o
w
n 
ex
pe
ns
es
...
3
Su
bs
cr
ib
in
g 
to
 th
e 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 fo
r e
m
ba
nk
m
en
t  
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
...
4
Vo
lu
nt
ar
y 
la
bo
ur
…
...
5
no
th
in
g.
...
.6
Bo
un
da
ry
 o
f t
he
 p
lo
t..
..1
En
tr
an
ce
 p
oi
nt
 o
f b
ra
ck
is
hw
at
er
…
...
2
O
th
er
s.
..3
Irr
ig
at
io
n.
..1
Pa
nc
ha
ya
t..
..2
Bi
g 
Fi
sh
er
y 
ow
ne
r/
Fi
sh
er
y 
Co
m
m
itt
ee
...
..3
Vi
lla
ge
 p
eo
pl
e.
..4
La
bo
ur
 d
ay
s.
..1
 (m
en
tio
n 
la
bo
ur
 h
ou
rs
) 
M
on
et
ar
y 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n.
...
2 
(R
s.
)
Su
pp
ly
 o
f m
ta
te
ria
ls
..3
 (R
s.
)
O
th
er
s.
...
.4
N
ot
hi
ng
...
5
Fo
r e
nu
m
er
at
or
s:
 C
on
si
de
r b
ot
h 
ag
ric
ul
tu
re
 a
nd
 fi
sh
er
y 
pl
ot
s 
al
on
g 
w
ith
 le
as
ed
 in
 p
lo
ts
South Asian Network for Development and Environmental Economics40
15
. E
xp
en
di
tu
re
 o
n 
Em
ba
nk
m
en
t M
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 in
 th
e 
la
st
 1
 y
ea
r p
ri
or
 to
 A
ila
15
.1
15
.2
15
.3
15
.4
Pl
ot
 
no
.
La
bo
ur
 d
ay
s 
sp
en
t i
n 
la
st
 1
 y
ea
r
O
th
er
 c
os
ts
 
Ba
nb
oo
,b
ric
k 
et
c.
 (R
s.
)
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 th
ro
ug
h 
co
m
m
itt
ee
/G
ro
up
1
2
3
4
Fa
m
ily
la
bo
ur
H
ire
d 
La
bo
ur
 
da
ys
(lo
ca
l) 
H
ire
d 
La
bo
ur
 d
ay
s
(o
ut
si
de
r)
To
ta
l e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 fo
r h
ire
d 
la
bo
ue
 
(k
in
d+
ca
sh
) (
Rs
.)
H
H
m
em
 
ID
.
La
bo
ur
 
da
ys
Ty
pe
 o
f e
xp
en
di
tu
re
O
ne
 ti
m
e.
.1
An
nu
al
…
..2
Ty
pe
 o
f E
xp
en
di
tu
re
M
on
et
ar
y 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n…
…
1
La
bo
ur
 d
ay
s…
2
La
nd
 c
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n…
3
M
on
et
ar
y 
va
lu
e 
(R
s.
)
En
um
er
at
or
s 
fil
l u
p
O
w
n 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 (R
s.
)
Am
oo
un
t o
f m
on
ey
 s
ub
m
itt
ed
 to
 c
om
m
itt
ee
(R
s.
)
Am
ou
nt
 o
f l
an
d 
co
nt
rib
ut
ed
 to
 c
om
m
itt
ee
(R
s.
)
Am
ou
nt
 o
f l
ab
ou
r d
ay
s 
co
nt
rib
ut
ed
Fo
r e
nu
m
er
at
or
s:
 C
on
si
de
r b
ot
h 
ag
ric
ul
tu
re
 a
nd
 fi
sh
er
y 
pl
ot
s 
al
on
g 
w
ith
 le
as
ed
 in
 p
lo
ts
. I
f m
or
e 
th
an
 o
ne
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
 m
em
be
r w
or
ke
d 
in
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
pl
ot
 m
en
tio
n 
in
 s
ep
ar
at
e 
ro
w
s.
41
Examining Private Participation in Embankment Maintenance in the Indian Sundarbans
16
. I
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t fi
sh
er
y 
co
m
m
it
te
e/
gr
ou
p
16
.1
16
.2
16
.3
16
.4
16
.5
16
.6
16
.7
Pl
ot
 n
o.
W
he
th
er
 in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 th
e 
co
m
m
itt
e
Co
m
po
si
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
Co
m
m
itt
te
e/
gr
ou
p
H
ow
 m
an
y 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 m
em
be
rs
 a
re
 
(a
) s
am
e 
re
lig
io
n
(b
)m
em
be
r o
f t
he
 s
am
e 
po
lit
ic
al
 p
ar
ty
(c
)S
up
po
rt
er
/w
or
ke
r o
f t
he
 s
am
e 
pa
rt
y
(d
) s
am
e 
H
H
 w
ea
lth
 lv
el
(e
) a
lm
os
t i
de
nt
ic
al
 la
nd
 p
ar
ce
el
s
So
ur
ce
 o
f 
Co
m
m
itt
ee
 
re
ve
nu
e
Le
as
e 
m
on
ey
 fr
om
 
do
na
te
 
la
nd
...
1
Pe
r b
ig
ha
 
m
on
ey
¡..
..2
ot
he
rs
3
1.
W
he
th
er
 c
om
m
itt
ee
 
ta
ke
s 
ac
tio
n 
fo
r m
em
be
r 
no
t a
ss
is
tii
ng
 in
 d
yk
e 
m
ai
nt
en
ac
e
Ye
s…
1 
N
o.
.2
2.
 n
at
ur
e 
of
 p
en
al
ty
 (c
od
e)
3.
 H
ow
 m
an
y
tim
es
 h
av
e 
yo
u 
ob
se
rv
ed
 
su
ch
 p
en
al
iz
at
io
n 
in
 la
st
 
3 
ye
ar
s 
1.
H
ow
 m
an
y 
da
ys
 a
fte
r 
Ai
la
 d
id
 th
e 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
co
nv
en
e 
a 
m
ee
tin
g
2.
W
as
 th
er
e 
an
y 
as
si
st
an
ce
 o
n 
th
e 
pa
rt
 
of
 c
om
m
itt
ee
 to
 s
ta
rt
 
ha
rv
es
tin
g 
af
te
r A
ila
ye
s.
...
1 
no
...
.2
if 
th
e 
an
sw
er
 is
 y
es
 
st
at
e 
th
e 
ty
pe
 o
f e
ffo
rt
 
un
de
rt
ak
en
Ye
s.
...
1
N
o.
.2
 
Pr
ev
iu
os
ly
 
it 
w
as
...
3*
Ti
m
e 
si
nc
e 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 in
cl
us
io
n
Yr
...
1
m
on
th
...
.2
Am
ou
nt
 
of
 la
nd
 
un
de
r t
he
 
co
m
m
itt
ee
(b
ig
ha
)
Ti
m
e 
un
it
Ti
m
e 
am
ou
nt
1 
N
o.
 o
f 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
m
em
be
rs
2 N
o.
 o
fc
om
m
ite
e 
m
em
be
rs
 d
ire
ct
ly
 
lin
ke
d 
w
ith
 
Pa
nc
ha
yt
s/
Po
lit
ic
al
 
pa
rt
y
3 N
at
ur
e 
of
 
re
la
tio
n 
w
ith
 
Pa
nc
ha
ya
ts
 
(c
od
e)
a
b
c 
 
d 
e
1
2
3
1
2
16
.3
16
.6
/1
Sa
bh
ap
at
i..
..1
Sa
ha
sa
bh
ap
at
i..
..2
Pr
ad
ha
n.
...
3
U
pa
pr
ad
ha
n.
...
.5
Sa
m
iti
 m
em
eb
be
r..
..6
M
em
be
r..
..4
O
th
er
s.
...
5
Th
re
at
 o
f s
to
pp
in
g 
w
at
er
...
.1
M
on
et
ar
y 
pe
na
lty
...
2
Cr
iti
ci
ze
 in
 o
pe
n 
fo
ru
m
3
ot
he
rs
...
.4
Po
st
 A
ila
 e
ffo
rt
s 
of
 th
e 
Co
m
m
itt
e 
:
1.
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
2.
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
.
Fo
r e
nu
m
er
at
or
s:
 C
on
si
de
r o
nl
y 
ow
n 
fis
he
ry
 p
lo
ts
 a
lo
ng
 w
ith
 le
as
ed
 in
 p
lo
ts
.



45
Examining Private Participation in Embankment Maintenance in the Indian Sundarbans
SANDEE
P.O. Box 8975, E.P.C 1056, Lalitpur, Nepal
Street address: c/o ICIMOD, Khumaltar, Lalitpur, Nepal
Tel: 977 1 5003222, Fax: 977 1 5003299, Email: info@sandeeonline.org Web: www.sandeeonline.org
SANDEE Sponsors
 
This is a download from the BLDS Digital Library on OpenDocs 
http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/ 
 
  
 
 
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons  
Attribution – NonCommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 License. 
 
 
 
To view a copy of the license please see: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/  
